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The passage of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
(DAWIA) and the creation of the Army Acquisition Corps have both
necessitated a shift in the way the Army acquires and trains its
Contracting and Industrial Management (FA 97) officers
.
This thesis examines the environment of the process of defense
acquisition beginning in the early 1980 's and traces the history of the
legislative procurement reform that lead to the passage of DAWIA and the
creation of a separate corps of acquisition professionals in the United
States Army.
The characterization of the present atmosphere of defense acquisition
is an austere one and because of this, FA 97 officers must be trained and
educated in the most cost effective and productive manner available. Most
importantly, the skills they learn must be those that are the most
critical to their future performance in the FA 97 arena. Therefore
,
interviews were conducted with FA 97 officers in the field to determine
which skills, classified into technical and management categories , were
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BROAD SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The Greek philosopher Heraclitus described the nature of time
by comparing it to flowing water, saying that "no man can step
twice into the same river." [Ref.l, pg 22] The river of defense
acquisition and its ever changing flow of procurement reform is
like the river of time, as Government studies, defense initiatives,
blue ribbon panels, and a seemingly endless stream of patchwork
defense legislation all buffet and rock the tiny raft on which
floats the world of the military and civilian acquisition
professional
.
It has also been said though, by philosophers of unknown
origin, that relatively little occurs that has not done so already,
at some distant place, in some time long past. Again, the world of
defense procurement fits in comfortably under the umbrella of this
general oversimplification of history. The acquisition environment
is a cyclical one, its fortunes rising and ebbing with that of the
defense establishment as a whole. One need only survey the
generally sorry state of the nation' s armed forces and the
procurement structure that supported them before any of the major
conflicts of the last two hundred years, the Civil War, World War
I, WW II, Korea, and Vietnam, for example, to be convinced of this
symbiotic relationship
.
Once war is upon the nation though, there is a singular rush
to do whatever is necessary to beat back the menace and return to
the status quo ante bellum. Unfortunately , for the defense
establishment , "status quo ante bellum" often means rapid
demobilization and dismantling of the nation's defense
infrastructure. The acquisition workforce is not immune to the
headlong rush to dismantle the defense establishment after what is
often and naively viewed as the last war this nation will ever have
to fight.
During the last decade however, wiser counsel has prevailed
against the rush to disestablish the gains of the defense buildup
during the years of the Reagan administration and its benefits for
our once "hollow" Army.
The creation of the Army Acquisition Corps and the passage of
the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) have
served notice to the nation as a whole that we can ill afford to
pursue the boom and bust cycles of defense preparedness which have
characterized much of our nation' s history.
The paradigm through which we viewed the nature of the world's
balance of power has irrevocably shifted with the collapse of
Communism and the Warsaw Pact. The assumptions upon which our
defense establishment was solidly built during the years of the
cold war are no longer valid. The need for a large standing defense
force to confront the menace of the unholy alliance of the
communist armies of eastern Europe no longer exists. The American
defense establishment is shrinking at an ever increasing rate as
8
the realization takes hold that the nation requires a smaller , more
mobile, more agile, but no less lethal, combination of armed
services
.
At the same time the defense establishment as a whole is
shrinking, so to is the mechanism in place to equip it and procure
for it the weapons, services , and equipment it needs for mission
accomplishment . Just as the armed services are being streamlined
for agility and lethality, so too must the defense acquisition
establishment be streamlined in order to provide the best possible
support for this new defense structure
.
B. THE ACQUISITION OF FUTURE FUNCTIONAL AREA 9 7 OFFICERS
The Army Acquisition Corps and DAWIA are the vehicles through
which the newly potent Functional Area 97 (Contracting and
Industrial Management) officer will be able to achieve his maximum
effective potential . The provisions of DAWIA mandate a lean and
exceptionally well-trained cadre of professional acquisition
officers and civilians that will be able to supply and equip the
armed services with the best possible equipment of the best value
at a commensurate price to the Government, well into the next
century. The difficulty and critical nature of this task is
greatly increased by the ever shrinking nature of defense funding
and general resourcing. The FA 97 officer will have to bring all
of his considerable talents and skills to bear in order to achieve
his mandate of accomplishing more with less.
The Army and its Corps of acquisition professionals must
ensure then, that its FA 97 officers acquire those skills which
will best equip them to meet the difficult challenges which lie
ahead. The FA 97 officer must not only become proficient in those
skills which have the highest return for the acquisition
profession, but he must also acquire them in a manner that is both
the most cost effective and resource and time efficient
.
The limited nature of the resource environment of the
foreseeable future makes it a defense imperative that the funds the
nation entrusts to her acquisition professionals not be squandered.
The trust of the nation must be garnered and husbanded most
carefully so as to preclude the disaster which would befall the
Armed Forces should the country decide that her precious resources
were being wasted in frivolous and needlessly expensive weapon
systems and equipment
.
C. TRAINING, EDUCATION & EXPERIENCE
Presently, the Army relies on a three tiered approach to
"manufacture" its Contracting and Industrial Management officers.
The three tiers are training, education and experience; but not
necessarily in that order of occurrence or priority.
Training is primarily "hands-on" and deals with the "how to"
of defense procurement. It is most commonly accomplished through
formal and ad hoc on-the-job programs at each of the organizations
where an entry level FA 97 officer can be assigned, most commonly
to a major buying command. The Training With Industry Program
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(TWI ) is also a component of this tier of the manufacturing process
and trains officers through a ten month internship at a major
civilian defense contractor.
Education consists of the Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS)
program, which allows selected officers the opportunity to earn a
masters degree at Government expense. Education is viewed as the
realm of the theory of defense procurement and concerns itself with
the "why" of acquisition vice the "how to." While training refers
to the imparting of ability to accomplish repetitive tasks,
education is that which imparts the ability to reason
independently; to analyze a presentation of data, distinguish the
relevant from the trivial and arrive at a sound and supportable
conclusion which can be translated into a decision or a plan of
action.
Experience is the frame of reference gained from actually
working in the procurement environment. It consists of all of the
endless impressions and intangibles derived from being immersed in
the actual environment - as opposed to having it described in the
artificial environment of a classroom. Education and training are
invaluable, but without a frame of reference to translate them into




The purpose of this thesis then, is to explore and delineate
the skills that an FA 97 officer will need to excel in the defense
11
acquisition environment of the 1990' s and beyond. These skills are
both technical and managerial . They include empirically oriented
reasoning abilities and the subjective and amorphous skills of
leadership. The efficiency of the Army's three tiered approach
will also be looked at and the value of graduate education f the TWI




A comprehensive review of the literature was first
accomplished to establish the history of how the present state of
the defense acquisition establishment came to be and to examine the
impetus behind the creation of the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) and
the ramifications of the passage of the Defense Acquisition
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) . The recent history of defense
procurement reform through legislative initiative bears directly on
this issue and is discussed beginning with the statutes governing
the length of service of project managers of major defense
acquisition programs. Its progression is traced through the spare
parts scandals of the 1980' s and concludes with the passage of
DAWIA and the creation of the AAC.
B. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH EFFORT
The scope of the research effort in this thesis is on the
delineation of the skills, experiences /assignment tours, and
abilities required to operate successfully as an FA 97 officer in
the Army Acquisition Corps. The main focus of this research effort
is on the development of a viable and attainable set of critical
and highly desirable skills for FA 97 officers of all grades, but






What are the requisite skills, abilities, knowledge
factors, and assignments that are appropriate for a
Functional Area (FA) 97 officer in the Army Acquisition
Corps (AAC) ?
2. Subsidiary:
a. How did the current state of the Army contracting
officer and the Army Acquisition Corps come to be ?
b. What are the requirements for FA 97 officers as
mandated by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement
Act (DAWIA) ?
c. What is the current state of thinking as expressed by
experienced FA 97 officers as to what the knowledge and
skill base of a FA 97 officer should be ?
d. What skills are critical for an FA 97 officer to
possess ?
e. What skills are highly desirable for an FA 97 officer
to possess ?
14
f. How might technical and managerial skills be
distinguished from each other ?
D. CONDUCT OF THE RESEARCH EFFORT
1. Comprehensive search of the literature,
2. Phone and personal interviews with FA 97 officers at the FA
97 Management Branch; the FA 97 Proponent; Headquarters
,
Department of the Army; Headquarters , Army Material Command
(AMC); various major subordinate commands of AMC
.
3. Typical questions asked during face-to face-interviews:
a. What is the most critical skill for a FA 97 officer to
have ?
b. What are other critical skills ?
c. What skills are highly desirable ?
d. Which set of skills is more important; technical or
managerial ?
e. What is the best way for an FA 97 officer to attain
these aforementioned skills ?
f. How valuable is on-the-job training (OJT) ?
g. How valuable is the Training With Industry Program
(TWI) ?
h. How valuable is a masters degree in business ?
i. In order of that which prepares you best to perform as
an FA 97 , how would you rank order OJT, a masters degree,
15
and TWI ?
j. What is the most desirable first assignment for an FA
97 officer in terms of that which prepares him best for
future assignments in Functional Area 97 ?
k. What do you think about the Army Acquisition Corps
(AAC) ?
I. What impact do you see the implementation of the
provisions of the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act having on Functional Area 97 ?
E. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Preliminary Conclusions:
1 . The skills considered most critical for officers in FA
97 include:
Development of a sound sense of
business judgement with special emphasis
on the fundamentals of financial and cost
accounting;
- Thorough familiarity with the basic
tenets of contract law and the provisions
of the regulatory guidelines from the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to
the next highest command' s supplement.
- Computer literacy to include a working
16
knowledge of wordprocessing , database
management and graphics software
.
- The ability to properly prepare for and
conduct negotiations with a civilian
contractor.
- The ability to express thoughts in
writing in a clear and succinct manner.
- Possession of the requisite leadership
and management temperaments attendant
with grade and time in service.
2. The skills considered highly desirable for officers in
Functional Area 97 include:
- Those which are derived from having
participated in the TWI program.
The ability to present a formal
military briefing.
3. Other observations include:
- The institution of the Army Acquisition
17
Corps structure has been received very
poorly among FA 97 officers in the field,
- The implementation of the provisions of
DAWIA is seen by FA 9 7 officers in the
field as striking a major blow against




The establishment at each major
subordinate command of the Army Material
Command of a transition course to
facilitate the adjustment of basic branch
officers to the civilian dominated
environment of defense contracting.
- The institution of a career management
policy that requires an Fa 97 officer's
initial assignment to be with a buyinc
command as a buyer before participatioi
in TWI or ACS.
18
F. LIMITATIONS
This thesis is limited in its scope in that the broad topic
areas of the critical skills for FA 97 officers are touched upon
only in a general sense. There is no attempt to break the tasks
identified herein into their component and subcomponent tasks.
This study does not purport to define an all-inclusive list of all
of the tasks an FA 97 officer could expect to have to perform
during a usual career progression. Additionally, the conclusions




This study is predicated upon the assumption that the process
of defense acquisition is a business as serious and professional as
any of the commonly recognized "civilian" professions, and as such
its practitioners should be endowed with a set of clearly
identifiable skills. These skills must be acquired in a manner
that is at once the most cost effective for the Government and
the most productive for the defense acquisition specialist
.
H. DEFINITIONS
1. Army Acquisition Corps:
"...an elite group of dedicated highly qualified officer
and civilian acquisition experts who serve in critical
acquisition management positions . " [Ref .12 ,pg 2].
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2. Functional Area 97 , Contracting and Industrial Management:
"The FA 97 officer is a highly skilled professional
soldier who must bridge the gap between civilian industry
and the military. Officers in this specialty are faced
with the challenge of ensuring that the Defense
acquisition process procures the required weapon systems,
supplies, and services to support and sustain the
readiness of our combat forces." [Ref. 10 ,pg 1]
I. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided an outline of the purpose of this
thesis, its scope and focus, and its methodology. Preliminary
conclusions and recommendations were presented. The next chapter
will discuss the background of the current defense acquisition
environment to include a look at the legislative history of recent
attempt at procurement reform. The events leading to the creation
of the Army Acquisition Corps will be covered and the impact of the




Besieged from all quarters in the war on procurement waste and
mismanagement , the Army realized in the latter years of the 1980'
s
that it would have to make some radical changes in the way it
chose, trained, and assigned its procurement officers . Although
the Army was to emerge relatively unscathed from the firestorm
created by the procurement scandals that rocked the 1980' s, the
embarrassment of the "Sergeant York" Division Air Defense Weapon
System notwithstanding, it did recognize the shortcomings of its
development system for civilian and military acquisition
professionals . [Ref .43 ,pgs 2-3]
Not lost on the Army too, was the irony of the situation that
precipitated the creation of the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) . The
Air Force, perhaps the one Service which bore the brunt of the
public outrage over allegations of procurement mismanagement , is
also the only Service with a procurement officer development system
which accesses officers directly from entry level and allows them
to "single track" as procurement specialists for their entire
careers. [Ref .30] The Army, however, has traditionally maintained
that a "dual tracking" system for officer career management is, in
most instances, the most effective use of officer corps talent.
[Ref. 17] By managing officers under a dual tracking system, the
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Army initially accesses them into a "basic branch," e.g. Infantry, I
Aviation, Quartermaster, etc. After approximately eight years of
service, officers are assigned a Functional Area (FA) . Functional I
Areas include such specialties as Public Affairs, Operations
Research , Foreign Area Specialist and Contracting and Industrial
Management
.
From the eighth year of service until retirement, Army
officers historically have been assigned in an alternating pattern
of basic branch and functional area assignments . While this
arguably made for a "well rounded" officer, it did little to foster
the expertise needed to perform and excel in the more technical
functional areas, contracting and industrial management chief among
them. [Ref.17]
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The attention focused on the procurement process as a result
of the highly publicized "spare parts scandals" of the early
1980' s, lead, in part, to the passage of Public Law 98-525 in
October of 1984. P.L. 98-525 ' s major stipulation was that managers
of major defense acquisition programs must serve as such for at
least four years or until completion of a program milestone. [Ref.
16,pg 19] Following close on the heels of P.L. 98-525, was P.L.
99-145, enacted in 1985, which required that the Services delineate
the education and training necessary to qualify an officer for
assignment as a program manager. [Ref. 40]
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In July of 1985, President Reagan established the "Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management" and chartered it to:
...study the issues surrounding defense management and
organizations , . . .review the procedures for developing and
fielding military systems incorporating new technologies
in a timely fashion , . . .and to make recommendations on how
to improve the effectiveness and stability of resource
allocation for defense systems. [Ref.45,pg 3]
Taking its name from Chairman David Packard, the Commission
delivered its final report in the summer of 1986. The report
outlined the fragmented nature of acquisition responsibility within
the Department of Defense (DOD) and noted that "the authority for
acquisition execution and accountability for its results was
diluted, depriving program managers of control over their own
programs" . [Ref .45 ,pg 12] Perhaps most importantly though, the
Packard Commission exposed the need for change in the way that DOD
acquired and managed its procurement workforce . Specifically, the
Commission called for the establishment of educational and
experience requirements for the civilian and military acquisition
workforce and expanded educational and professional opportunities
for civilians . [Ref.45,pg 14]
The passage in 1986 of Public Law 99-661, the Defense
Acquisition Improvement Act, commonly known as the Goldwater-
Nichols Act, was the first tangible result of the impact of the
Packard Commission. Goldwater-Nichols created the position of
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USDA) and delineated
the scope of its authority as encompassing "the supervision of all
military and civilian personnel in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) with regard to matters for which the Under Secretary
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has responsibility" . [Ref .6 ,pg 17] Furthermore, Goldwater-Nichols
mandated the creation of a plan to "enhance the professionalism of
,
and career opportunities for, the acquisition personnel of DOD" .
[Ref.6,pg 18]
The legislation specified that these plans should include
"standards for the examination, appointment, classification,
training, and assignment of acquisition personnel as well as
determination of the feasibility of designating certain acquisition
positions within DOD as professional ones". [Ref .1 ,pg 24]
The next step in the creation of a professional corps of Army
acquisition specialists occurred in August of 1988 with the
promulgation of DOD Directive 5000.52. This directive consolidated
the requirements and criteria for eligibility, experience,
training, and assignment for all DOD acquisition specialists and
applied these consolidated requirements to both civilian and
military personnel . These newly revamped criteria were used to
screen individuals considered for assignment to acquisition
management positions . [Ref . 14 ,pg 4]
Directed by President Bush to improve the performance of the
defense acquisition process and to find ways to more effectively
manage DOD' s shrinking resources , the Secretary of Defense
committed his department to nothing less than the substantive
changes that would be required to meet the President ' s mandate.
The Defense Management Review (DMR) of 1989 was the crystallization
of this commitment as it became the Secretary' s vehicle to further
study the progress of the implementation of the recommendations of
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the Packard Commission. [Ref .17 ,pg 52]
Subsequently , the DMR found that in order to reduce operating
costs as necessitated by rapidly diminishing budgets while
maintaining the prescribed level of military strength, the Services
in general , and the Army in particular, would have to initiate
extensive reorganization and realignment of their procurement
command structure . Most significantly for the yet to be created
AAC , was the pronouncement that in order to enhance the performance
of weapon system procurement efforts, the Army would necessarily
have to focus on the professional development and career
opportunities for its acquisition workforce . [Ref .8 ,pg 40]
It was in this environment of the breakdown of the acquisition
process, the intense, but fleeting, public outrage following every
new admission of excess, and the legislative remedies hastily
assembled in righteous indignation to fix the broken system, that
both the Army Acquisition Corps and the Defense Acquisition
Workforce Improvement Act came into being. [Ref .17 ,pg 20]
C. CREATION OF THE ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS
The official Army information pamphlet on the Army
Acquisition Corps states that:
The Army depends on the quality of its material and
weapon systems to meet its national security
responsibilities . It is imperative that our development
and acquisition processes permit us to exploit fully the
great promise of American technology while at the same
time maintaining the streamlined and efficient management
structures. In light of this, the Army Acquisition Corps
was formed to attract, select, develop and retain the
most capable members of the workforce to fill our
critical acquisition positions. [Ref .12 ,pg 1]
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As the precursor to this charter, the Army Acquisition Corps
formally came into being, in January of 1989, following a joint
announcement from the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the
Army. This new corps of acquisition professionals , said the chief
civilian and military executives of the Army, would provide a corps
of dedicated professionals who are experts in systems development
and procurement. More importantly, they went on to add, the AAC
would integrate education, training, experience, selection, and
promotion processes for all military and civilian members of the
acquisition corps. [Ref .8 ,pg 41]
Initial plans called for an end strength of 1,350 military and
civilian members occupying critically coded acquisition positions
in program executive offices, program management offices and
support and staff positions in Army Support Commands and major
field headquarters . To fill these 1350 critically coded positions,
a pool of some 2,900 "acquisition corps candidates" would have to
be identified at approximately their eighth year of service and
selected for special assignment and training to eventually be
qualified to fill a critical position. [Ref. 30]
The Army Acquisition Corps is composed of the following
Military Functional Areas:
1. FA 51; Research and Development.
2. FA 53; Systems Automation.
3. FA 97; Contracting and Industrial Management.
4. FA 15/35; Aviation/Intelligence.
[Ref.l2,pg 3]
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Although Army Officers selected for accession into the AAC
continue to wear the insignia of their basic branch, e.g. Infantry,
Aviation, Ordnance, etc, they will no longer compete for
assignments or command within their basic branches nor will they
compete for promotion with their basic branch peers. The AAC is a
fundamentally new career track, with the stipulation that members
are to be assigned to procurement programs related to their basic
branches . This relationship between an officer's basic branch and
assignments within the AAC makes the best use of eight years of
branch experience and brings a "muddy boots" perspective to the
sometimes rarified atmosphere of defense procurement. [Ref.30]
For civilians, the AAC will also operate as a separate career
track, but with one major difference . Civilians will compete for
assignments both inside the framework of the AAC as well as in
their traditional specialty. The AAC will pull those who are
already at middle management positions and in different
occupational areas and provide them with a broader, yet common,
acquisition education and training base. Civilian AAC members,
like their military counterparts, fall under the cognizance of the
Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) . [Ref .2 ,pgs 36-37] The AAE is the
functional chief and proponent of the AAC and is charged with the
responsibility for administering both military and civilian AAC
members. [Ref .14 ,pg 10]
D. FA 97 PARTICIPATION IN THE ACQUISITION CORPS
The FA 97 Officer is a highly skilled, professional
soldier who must bridge the management gap between
27
civilian industry and the military. Officers in this
specialty are faced with the challenge of ensuring that
the Defense acquisition process procures the required
weapon systems, supplies, and services to support and
sustain the readiness of our combat forces.
[Ref.lO,pg 1]
In support of this charter, officer positions in Functional
Area 97 are structured to run the gamut of both staff and
operational organizations at all levels of the Army. Open equally
to both male and female officers for example , the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Defense Logistics Agency, and various
Joint Duty Assignments , are all illustrative of the diversity of
assignment possibilities for FA 97 officers . [Ref .10 ,pgs 2-3]
Presently there are slightly over 1,800 officers with the FA
97 designation out of a total procurement population of
approximately 11,800. Thus the ratio of civilian 1100 series
contracting specialists to military contracting and industrial
management officers is almost 10:1. [Ref. 29]
Indicative of the special relationship between the military
and civilian industry in the procurement arena, are the primary
responsibilities that a FA 97 officer can expect to be charged
with. These responsibilities can come at an assignment at
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) , the U.S. Army Material
Command (AMC), other Major Commands (MACOMs) within the Army, the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) , or while assigned against a Joint
Duty position. [Ref .10 ,pg 1]
First among these responsibilities are those of a
Procurement Staff Officer (PSO) . A PSO is primarily concerned with
the "overall development , implementation , management , direction and
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control of procurement programs
,
program planning and general
supervision of major procurement activities or functions . " [Ref.10
pg 2] Next, an FA 97 officer can expect to eventually assume the
duties of a Contracts Management Officer (CMO)
.
A CMO is
"warranted to legally obligate the U.S. Government by entering into
and terminating binding contractual agreements with a wide variety
of corporate entities ." [Ref. 10 ,pg 2] Third is the mantel of an
Industrial Management Officer (IMO) who is "responsible for
applying industrial , manufacturing and production technical
expertise within the procurement function." [Ref .10 ,pg 3]
Finally f and perhaps most importantly, FA 97 Officers can
anticipate competition for command positions at the 0-5 and 0-6
level. Chief among these are command of an Army Procurement
Agency, command of a Defense Contract Management Region (DCMR)
,
command of a Defense Contract Management Area of Operations
(DCMAO) , or command of a Defense Plant Representative Office
(DPRO) . [Ref.38,pg 4]
As previously discussed, the Contracting and Industrial
Management Functional Area is not aligned with any of the basic
branches of the Army. Award of the FA 97 designation is done only
after an officer's basic branch qualification, usually occurring at
around the eighth year of commissioned service. Until October of
1991, officers who were designated as FA 97 ' s were not necessarily,
nor automatically , also accessed into the Acquisition Corps. In
fact, an FA 97 officer previously could pursue one of three
possible career tracks. The first of these included the "dual
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track" path in which the officer alternated between basic branch
and FA 97 assignments . The second was the "single track" in which
the officer served only in FA 97 assignments for the remainder of
his career. The last of the three tracks was accession into the
Army Acquisition Corps where the officer served only in FA 97
assignments coded for AAC designees. The AAC track was the only one
of the three that did not subject the officer to a branch
immaterial assignment, i.e. recruiting officer, Reserve Officer
Training Command, or reserve component adviser. [Ref.10]
However, on 11 October of 1991, the Chief of Staff of the
Army, General Gordon Sullivan, approved initiatives that will
result in a sweeping reorganization of Functional Area 97 and its
relationship to the Army Acquisition Corps.
The most significant of the changes is the decision to bring
all FA 97 Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel command positions under
the cognizance of the Acquisition Corps. Beginning with the 1993
command selection board process, only FA 9 7 officers who are
members of the Acquisition Corps will be eligible for consideration
for these command positions . There are presently twenty-three 0-6
command positions and twenty 0-5 command positions for FA 97
designees . The command positions are divided between the agencies
and organizations previously mentioned. [Ref.38,pg 4]
Additionally, a formal policy has been promulgated which puts
FA 97 officers on an equal footing with their FA 51 counterparts in
the competition for product manager and program manager
assignments
.
FA 97 officers will compete with all other
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Acquisition Corps officers for these positions on a "best
qualified" basis i.e., the best qualified officer, regardless of
functional area designation, will be selected for the position.
Finally, no longer will FA 97 officers have the option to
choose between three distinct career patterns and alternate between
assignments in FA 97 and their basic branches . Functional Area 97
has been converted to a single track functional area and will be
integrated into the Acquisition Corps. Thus, all FA 97 officers
will automatically be AAC members and will pursue a single track
career path with assignments only in FA 97. [Ref.38,pg 4]
E. THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE IMPROVEMENT ACT
Considering the history of legislative procurement reform as
discussed here, Title XII of the FY 91 National Defense
Authorization Act, commonly known as the Defense Acquisition
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) , can be viewed as the capstone of
a decade' s long trend, as "DAWIA seeks to build on what has gone
before." [Ref.l7,pg 50]
The broad effect of DAWIA is a requirement for the
establishment of coordinated policies for the management of
acquisition personnel amongst all of the Services and the
Department of Defense. The Undersecretary of Defense
(Acquisition) , assisted by the director of acquisition education,
training and career development, has primary responsibility within
DOD for the uniform implementation of the provisions of DAWIA.
The Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) , advised by an acquisition
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career board, has the responsibility for the recruitment, education
and career management for civilian and military acquisition
personnel within his own military department. [Ref .17 ,pq 50]
One of DAWIA's primary requirements is that each of the
Services establish a separate corps of acquisition professionals
.
The other primary requirement is that the Secretary of Defense
formally designate a limited number of critical acquisition corps
positions and that these positions only be filled by specially
qualified acquisition corps members. [Ref .40 , sec 1731]
An Army officer accessed into the AAC at the eighth year of
service as an 0-3 is given a "4M" code and is designated a
"candidate"
.
Only after certain mandated educational and
experience levels are met and promotion to 0-4, is an officer's
code changed to "4Z", acquisition corps member. [Ref.8,pg 42]
The "acquisition corps" itself is actually limited to 0-4'
s
and GS-13's and above. Since the Army recruits and brings officers
into the corps at eight years of service even though the "pin on"
point for major is at approximately twelve years, captains accessed
into the corps and awaiting promotion to major are acquisition
corps "candidates" and do not compete for assignment to any
critical acquisition position. Once promotion is realized and full
membership attained, a major or lieutenant colonel assigned to a
critical position must remain so for at least three years. [Ref .40,
sec 1734]
In addition to mandating minimum tour lengths for the more
important acquisition jobs, DAWIA also lays down the following
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requirements in order for an acquisition corps candidate/member to
serve as a contracting officer with a warrant to obligate above the
small purchase threshold . First, an AAC member must have completed
a specified series of mandatory courses required for that position
.
For the Army, this consists of the Management of Defense
Acquisition Contracts , Basic (MDACC , Basic) , taught at the Army
Logistics Management Center (ALMC) at Ft Lee, Virginia; Management
of Defense Acquisition Contracts , Advanced (MDACC ,Advanced) , also
an ALMC taught course; Principles of Contract Pricing, taught by
the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) , at Wright-Patterson
Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio; Government Contract Law, another
AFIT managed course; and the Management of Defense Acquisition
(Executive) , taught by ALMC. [Ref .10 ,pgs 5-6]
One of the most important features of DAWIA falls under the
rubric of the professionalization of the acquisition workforce
DAWIA mandates no less than a baccalaureate degree from an
accredited institution with at least twenty- four hours of
concentration in one of a number of primarily business-related
disciplines . Additionally, DAWIA stipulates that an acquisition
professional must have at least four years of contracting
experience before being eligible for assignment to a critical
acquisition position as a senior contracting official . [Ref .40, sec
1741]
Other education and training programs that must be created to
comply with DAWIA include internships for the purpose of providing
talented individuals the opportunity for accelerated promotions and
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assignments and training to prepare them for entry into the
acquisition corps. Also, a series of scholarship and tuition
reimbursement programs will be set up to attract qualified
candidates for designated acquisition positions . [Ref .40 ,sec 1743]
Finally, DAWIA calls for the creation of a Defense Acquisition
University structure and management information system to further
the development of acquisition education opportunities. [Ref. 40,
sec 1746]
Although a dominant theme of DAWIA is the professionalization
of the acquisition workforce through the enhancement of training
and educational programs and attendant career opportunities , a
major thrust is the gradual increase of civilian acquisition
professionals over their military brethren. As career paths are
established and critical positions designated, the ability to fill
them with military officers is restricted. DAWIA stipulates that
for an officer to hold a critical acquisition position it must: 1
be required by law; 2. be essential for the performance of the
discharge of the duties of the position; or 3. be otherwise
necessary. [Ref .40 , sec 1722]
The Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition) is required to
submit a list to the Secretary of Defense every year that specifies
those acquisition positions that are to be restricted to military
officers. The Secretary of Defense is charged with the
responsibility of ensuring that qualified civilian professionals
have the same opportunities as their military counterparts to meet
the requirements for assignment to senior acquisition positions.
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"The emphasis of these provisions is to ensure that the 'best
qualified' individual, consistent with other applicable laws, is
selected for each acquisition position. " [Ref .40 ,sec 1702]
This piece of legislation is not unlike many others in that
there are exceptions to its mandated requirements . The educational
requirements do not apply to members of the acquisition workforce
who have at least ten tears of experience in the procurement field
as of 1 October, 1991. As of 1 October, 1993 these same provisions
do not apply to any members to qualify them to remain in their
current , or comparable, positions . Additionally, the qualifying
provisions applying to military contracting officers can be waived
by the acquisition career program board of the corresponding
Service . These waiver provisions of DAWIA provide for minimal
disruption and allow for continuity during the implementation phase
of the law between what was the Army's Material Acquisition
Management Program and its successor, the AAC . [Ref . 17 ,pg 53]
F. RAMIFICATIONS
The single most "troubling" aspect of the provisions of DAWIA
for members of the AAC is what could be a threat to the very
existence of a special corps of primarily military acquisition
specialists. DAWIA might well be the beginning of the end for the
Army's fledgling corps. The cause of this concern is the very
broad, yet very specific, mandate that the acquisition functions of
the Armed Services be civilianized to an extent hitherto unthought
of. [Ref .40, sec 1722] In its attempt to legislate quality and
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professionalism into the cadre of Army procurement specialists
,
DAWIA simultaneously , and not accidentally, opens up a great number
of heretofore exclusively military billets to DOD civilians . [Ref.
2 ,pg 36]
The Army has had to back away from its initial estimates of
acquisition corps endstrength when confronted with DAWIA'
s
stipulations on grade requirements . Only 0-4 's and their civilian
equivalents and above who have met the requisite education and
experience levels, or who have been granted a waiver, can be
"official members" of the acquisition corps. The official
acquisition corps is smaller under DAWIA then, because of DAWIA'
refined definition of what constitutes a member. [Ref .30]
The AAC has also had to abandon plans to send all its
junior members back to their basic branches for a "re-greening"'
assignment of three years at approximately their twelfth year of
service . The original plan was for a potential acquisition corp
member to either be sent to graduate school or to the Training With
Industry (TWI) program and then immediately be sent for a
utilization tour and then to this "back to the trenches" tour. The
experience level provisions of DAWIA quashed these plans as there
is not enough time in one career to satisfy DAWIA and be "re-
greened." [Ref. 29]
The Army Acquisition Corps however, was not caught terribly
unprepared in its efforts to implement the educational requirements
of DAWIA. The Army has long had graduate education programs anc
apprentice training programs with industry for officers . The
36
challenge, against the backdrop of an uncertain future, lies in
creating these same types of educational opportunities for
civilians
.
The overwhelming opinion expressed to this researcher while
conducting interviews for this thesis was that there is no doubt
about the absolutely critical need for military representation in
the procurement process. A number of personal stories were related
in which it was only through the application of the "muddy boots"
experience of a military officer that the Government saved large
amounts of money by either not purchasing or modifying products
that civilian contracting officers were going to buy. Only the
military officers , because of their firsthand experience with
troops, could know that soldiers in the field neither would not,
nor could not, use these products
.
The primary concern lies squarely in the context of the
ensuing force drawdown. The National Defense Authorization Act for
FY 91, of which DAWIA is part, mandates an annual four percent
reduction in acquisition personnel in the Department of Defense
over the next five years. Currently, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) places the number of military and civilian procurement
workers in DOD at approximately 580,000. If the reductions of the
FY 91 Defense Authorization Act are carried out, 107,000 military
personnel and civilians will be discharged from the acquisition
workforce. Similarly, the implementation of the initiatives of the
Defense Management Review of 1989 would see a reduction of some
24,000 civilian positions and 2,000 military ones from the defense
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acquisition workforce. [Ref.42 ,pg 6]
Equally troubling for the military contracting officer, is the
stated preference of the DMR to reclassify some 20,000 previously
military positions as civilian ones. The force behind this
preference appears to be the lower level of compensation for a mid-
career civil servant vice that of a comparable military officer.
Also, the average tour length of four years appears to give the
advantage to civilians in the categories of continuity and savings
in relocation costs. [Ref .6 ,pg 5]
As funding becomes increasingly tighter and manning levels
reach all time lows, will the Army be able to justify a significant
number of its quality officers filling jobs away from troops ?
Jobs that some say can be performed better by civilians anyway ?
It is of course too close to call now, but a number of officers
interviewed by this researcher predicted that DAWIA, coupled with
the defense cutbacks, might spell the end for any kind of career
for an officer in the Army Acquisition Corps. Hence, it has become
a matter of survival that Army Acquisition Corps officers are
educated in the most efficient and effective way possible; that the
skills they need to contribute to the overall accomplishment of the
Army's mission are identified and given to them and that they
become the experts in their field.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has briefly outlined and described the
procurement environment with which defense acquisition
38
professionals found themselves confronted during the preceding
twenty years. The passage of the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act can be seen as the logical end-product of prior
attempts at legislating procurement reform. Alert for what was on
the legislative horizon, Army officials announced the creation of
what was to be later mandated by DAWIA, i.e. the Army Acquisition
Corps, in early 1989.
As a separate entity of procurement professionals , the AAC is
supposed to provide the nurturing atmosphere that will allow the
generation of a special class of highly educated, thoroughly
trained, and intensely motivated acquisition professionals . With
all of its positive aspects however, DAWIA also brings with it the
very troubling possibility of the complete civilianization of the
business of acquisition, as its provisions mandate continually
increasing civilian presence on the procurement stage.
The proceeding chapter will move to the specifics of the
nature of the skill base necessary for successful performance as an
FA 97 officer. The questions asked of the officers interviewed in






Current Assignments of Interviewees
A • tal of twenty-four officers were interviewed at ten
different organizations . The breakdown of interviews at each
officer's current organization of assignment is as follows:
AVIATION SUPPORT COMMAND, (AVSCOM) , St Louis, Missouri: 2
TANK AND AUTOMOTIVE COMMAND, (TACOM), Warren, Michigan: 4
COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONIC COMMAND, (CECOM) , Ft Monmouth,
New Jersey : 4
MISSILE COMMAND, (MICOM) , Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville,
Alabama : 3
TROOP SUPPORT COMMAND, (TROSCOM) , St Louis, Missouri: 1
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY, (DLA) , Cameron Station, Alexandria,
Virginia: 2
DEFENSE SERVICES MANAGEMENT COLLEGE, (DSMC), Ft Belvoir,
Virginia: 2
OFFICE OF THE FUNCTIONAL AREA 9 7 PROPONENT, Alexandria,
Virginia: 1
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND, (HQ,AMC), Alexandria,
Virginia: 3
PENTAGON, Washington, D.C.: 2
2. Rank And Length of Service
All interviewees were commissioned U.S. Army officers with
the Functional Area (FA) 97 (Contracting and Industrial Management)
40
designation . The rank of the interviewees ranged from Captain (0-
3) to Colonel (0-6) . The average length of commissioned service was
fourteen years. The shortest length of service was twelve years
and the longest was twenty- four years. The average length of total
time spent in FA 97 assignments was three years. The officer with
the least amount of FA 97 experience had four months. The greatest
amount of time (cumulative) spent in FA 97 assignments was over
seven years. The explicit breakdown of interviewees by rank is as
follows:
CAPTAIN (0-3) : 1
MAJOR (0-4) : 11
LIEUTENANT COLONEL (0-5): 6
COLONEL (0-6) : 6
3. Types of Contracting Experience
All of the interviewees were asked to briefly sketch their
assignment history , with emphasis on their FA 97 assignments , as an
individual officer's answers could conceivably vary considerably
based on type, length, and number of FA 97 assignments served.
Additionally, the area of contracting in which the interviewee
served, e.g. major systems procurement or installation level
contracting, could be expected to "color" the answers that this
researcher received in response to questions posed.
A variety of assignments and contracting experience came to
light, but the preponderance of experience was in areas other than
contracting for major weapon systems.
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Of the twenty-four officers interviewed, three had never
possessed a contracting warrant of any type. The remainder had all
been warranted at various times in their careers from $25,000 up to
an unlimited warrant. The following numbers of officers had
experience in these areas:
PROCURING/ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICER: 21
MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM PROCUREMENT: 3
COMMANDER, MAJOR CONTRACTING ACTIVITY: 3
POST, CAMP & STATION LEVEL CONTRACTING: 1
SMALL PURCHASE CONTRACTING: 21
SPARES PROCUREMENT: 21
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING: 1
4 . Basic Branches
Three of the twenty-four officers had served in branches
other than their current ones because of branch detailing at
commissioning or branch transferring at some time during their













Seventy- five percent of the interviewees had masters
degrees in business management or business administration . Of this
seventy- five percent, eleven percent had degrees in contracting and
industrial management from the Florida Institute of Technology
through its extension program at Ft Lee , Virginia . All of the
twenty-one officers who currently possess or had possessed warrants
at some time in their careers have completed the four required
courses offered by the Army Logistics Management College (ALMC) at
Ft Lee. (These are the basic and advanced contracting courses , cost
and pricing, and the contract law course) . Additionally, twenty
percent of the interviewees had participated in the Training With
Industry Program, sixteen percent were graduates of the ALMC
Program Manager' s course and four percent were graduates of the
Material Acquisition Management Course.
B. QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES
1 . WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER TO BE THE MOST CRITICAL SKILL THAT AN
FA 9 7 OFFICER MUST POSSESS IN ORDER TO SUCCESSFULLY DISCHARGE
THE FULL RANGE OF DUTIES HE MAY HAVE WHILE POSTED TO THE FULL
RANGE OF FA 9 7 ASSIGNMENTS ?
a. GOOD BUSINESS SENSE
Fully eighty percent of the interviewees emphatically replied
that "a good business sense," derived from "a general, but solid
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business background, " was the skill most critical to success as a 1
FA 97 officer. They went on to add that regardless of the specific
assignment, this business acumen provides the solid foundation that
the Army contracting officer needs to perform effectively.
b. NO PARTICULAR SKILL
Eight percent of the respondents stated that no particular
skill was especially critical and that although a "business)
background" was "good to have, " the lack of such would not render]
a contracting officer ineffective. Their assertion was that
everything that a FA 97 officer needs to know to be able to do his
job, can be learned on the job.
c. COMMUNICATIONS SKILLS
Eight percent stated that "communication skills were
absolutely the most critical ... " to success as a contracting
officer. The respondents in this category defined "communications
skills" as those which allow an officer to transfer information anc
convey meaning orally and through use of the written word.
d. CONTRACT LAW
The remaining four percent made a case for a thorougt
understanding of "the legal proprieties of contracting" as the most
critical skill amongst all of those a contracting officer must have
for "survival . " Although only this small percentage stated that a
rigorous grounding in the intricacies of contract law was the most
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important skill that a contracting officer should possess , over
half of the total number of interviewees mentioned at some time
during the course of their interview that a knowledge of the
regulations was critical . Of particular importance said this
group, was an immediate working knowledge of the legal
ramifications and regulatory clauses pertaining to contract
disputes and terminations
.
e. SPECIALIZED ACCOUNTING SKILL
Of the eighty percent who responded positively about the need
for a business background, eighteen percent strongly asserted to
this researcher that a mere "background" in business was not
sufficient. These officers stated that a background of the type
obtained through a rigorous Masters Of Business Administration
(MBA) program, received at a respected graduate institution, was
critical to effective job performance. One senior officer stated
that an FA 97 officer needs to "understand the business world, and
the only way to do that is to be educated like a businessman."
This same officer stated that the level of expertise required in
the FA 97 area was not unlike that required of Certified Public
Accountants (CPA) and that for an FA 97 to pursue an advanced
degree in accounting would "not be overkill ."
2. WHAT TYPES OF TECHNICAL SKILLS AND ABILITIES CONTRIBUTE TO
DEVELOPING A "STRONG BUSINESS BACKGROUND" AND "A GOOD BUSINESS
SENSE ?"
The same eighty percent of officers who answered question #1
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with "a strong business background" stated that a sound familiarity
with the fundamentals of both financial and cost accounting were
the two most important technical aspects of developing an overall
sense of business judgement . Furthermore, this same majority of
respondents answered that the ability to perform both price and
cost analysis, coupled with the ability to structure empirically
and objectively based evaluation systems for proposal evaluation
was "part and parcel" to having a solid grounding in the basics of
business administration as related to contracting skill. Other
contributing technical skills are listed here in order of the
frequency of the number of times of their mention:
Identify proper clauses for contract type: 20
Understand contract law: 17
Prepare a negotiations position: 17
Determine a fair and reasonable price: 14
Understand contract protests and terminations : 12
Apply results of a Defense Contract Audit Agency audit: 10
Assemble a contract : 7
Understand how contractor accumulates and charges costs: 7
Analyze overhead rates: 5
Write a statement of work: 5
Utilize mathematical forecasting models: 4
Utilize the techniques of quantitative analysis: 4
Understanding Cost Accounting Standards: 4
Understand mechanics of small purchase procedures: 2
Become a Certified Professional Contract Manager (CPCM) : 2
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Assemble a solicitation document: 1
Utilize the backwards planning process: 1
Employ a learning curve: 1
Understand how to document a contract file: 1
Know Planning, Programming, Budgeting, System (PPBS) : 1
Understand cost and schedule control criteria: 1
Understand a contractor' s disclosure statement: 1
Use the changes clause: 1
Understand how to modify a contract: 1
Employ Best Value Criteria: 1
Understand a contractor' s capitalization process: 1
3. WHAT IS THE BEST WAY FOR AN FA 97 OFFICER TO
DEVELOP/OBTAIN THESE SKILLS ?
a. ON-THE-JOB TRAINING
Fifty-four percent of the respondents stated that because of
the ability to focus "on-the-job-training" (OJT) on the specifics
of job performance, it was the most efficient and thorough way to
obtain the skills discussed in question #1 above. This majority
asserted that an officer "with any amount of get-up-and-go" could
transition directly from a field assignment with troops in any of
the Army's basic branches to an entry level FA 97 assignment and
pick up all of the skills needed to function successfully. Stated
one officer, who had been transferred from a "very technical"
electronics position into the acquisition corps and is working as
a contracts specialist at a major buying command; "Army officers
have the inherent ability to take whatever job is given them and
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apply themselves to it until they become proficient at it."
The amount of time specified in official policy to train an
officer before being warranted averaged two years at the major
buying commands. One experienced officer stated that despite the
official policies of his command, the reality was that some
officers were being warranted within six months of assuming a
contracting position. Two other officers at different commands
said that within four months of assuming duties as a contract
specialist and immediately after completion of the MDACC Basic
course they "found themselves with an unlimited warrant."
All of the officers who responded, that the best way to
develop the necessary FA 97 skills was while working in a FA 97
position, issued a caveat that the mandatory courses offered by the
Acquisition Enhancement Program Office (ACE) at Ft Belvoir,
Virginia, were an integral part of their definition of on-the-job
training. A senior officer at a major subordinate command (MSC) of
AMC made this assertion in regards to learning how to perform at
his command; "Training is more important than education. . .better to
be a buyer than go to school .
"
Of the fifty-four percent of officers who stated that learning
while working in an FA 97 position was the best way to be trained,
over half do not have masters degrees.
One of these officers without a degree declaimed that . .
.
"the
schoolhouse (graduate school) doesn't teach you the mechanics of
how to do a buy. They teach you what the FAR says and how to stay
out of jail, but not the nuts and bolts of buying..." This officer
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went on to say that he had never felt disadvantaged by not having
a graduate business degree. In his experience , the most important
thing was the "mechanics" and the only way to learn the mechanics
was to practice them through "hands on" training.
The only officer with contingency contracting experience
,
obtained during Operation Desert Storm, also asserted that a
Masters degree was superfluous . Said he;
It didn't hurt one wit not having one when I deployed (to
Saudi Arabia) . And as far as I'm concerned the whole
reason military contracting officers exist is to deploy
in situations like Desert Storm.
b. MASTERS DEGREE
Thirty-three percent of the interviewees stated that they
thought a masters degree in business administration was the best
way to obtain the skills critical to FA 97 job performance . There
was no distinction made between any of the following types of
masters programs:
-Fully funded MBA programs at civilian institutions
-Fully funded Masters of Contracting and Acquisition
Management at: 1. Naval Postgraduate School
2. Florida Institute of Technology
3. Air Force Institute of Technology
4. Programs similar to 1 - 3 above.
-Programs at the individual officer's own expense
In supporting his opinion that a masters degree in business is
essential to a complete mastery of the full range of talents
expected of an FA 97 officer, one respondent said;
If your view of procurement is one of a collection of
clerks and low level administrators , then all you need is
some on-the-job training and the ACE courses, but if you
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hold the wider view that procurement is rightly a
profession in all aspects of the word, then you can not
do with out graduate level education.
Said another officer presently assigned as the head of a
buying team at a major subordinate command of the Army Materiel
Command;
Never have I had a job since I've been in the service
where I've had to know not only the 'how' but more
importantly the 'why' as well. I've never had to be more
of an expert than in the job I've got right now.
The percentage of officers who expressed a distinction between
the theory and practice of contracting were a minority of the
percentage of ones who designated a masters degree as most
important to FA 97 skill development. Of the eight officers who
listed a masters degree as most important , only three elaborated by
distinguishing between the "theory" derived from graduate education
and the "nuts and bolts" obtained from actual experience in the
workplace . A common thread however, running through what all of
those who favored the masters degree over the other methods said,
was that graduate business education was very important for an
individual contracting officer's "confidence level," A masters
degree in business was seen as an equalizer in the sometimes
lopsided environment of government - contractor relations.
Confronted with "the best and the brightest" that civilian
contractors often assemble to do battle on their part, a masters in
business was seen as a way to level the playing field, though one
officer claimed that "you can never win with these guys, they're
too smart. It's just a matter of minimizing how much you lose,"
Of the sixty-seven percent of officers who said that a Masters
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Degree was not the best way to become proficient in contracting
skills, most later stated that it certainly "couldn' t hurt" and
that it was a must for promotion competitiveness , especially since
the passage of The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act.
c. TRAINING WITH INDUSTRY PROGRAM
The FA 97 Training-With-Industry program takes selected
procurement officers and places them for ten months with either
private industry, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, or the Defense
Logistics Agency. The goals of the program as outlined in the FA 97
TWI 1991-1992 Student Handbook are to:
-Learn how private industry conducts business
and then utilize this information to the
Army's advantage upon return.
-Obtain training in industrial procedures and
practices which is not available through the
military service school system.
-Provide a nucleus of officers trained in
higher level managerial techniques
.
-Enhance the capability of officers to perform
Army special program activities.
-Serve as a source of information concerning
innovations in industrial management practices
and/or techniques. [Ref .39 ,pg 3]
The remaining thirteen percent of the interviewees placed the
Training With Industry (TWI) program at the top of the most
critical list. All of the officers in this thirteen percent had
been selected for TWI participation at one time or another during
their careers and all expressed to this researcher very positive
feelings about their TWI experiences . The overall opinion was that
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there was no substitute for learning how "the other half lives, " as
one officer said, adding that " a contractor thinks about profit in
terms of Return on Assets/Equity . . .that's altogether different then
the way we (the Government) see it. TWI is the best way to get a
handle on that way of thinking.
"
Discussion of the Training With Industry program evoked strong
responses from the entire group of officer's interviewed, whether
they had participated in it or not. The range of opinion went from
those who considered it a "gift" or "good deal" for officers who
happened to be at the right place in their careers when TWI
positions were available and merely "frosting on the cake, " to
those who stated it was the best of all the formal programs in the
Army's educational inventory. The majority of the total number of
officers interviewed, eighty-seven percent, stated that the TWI
program offered an excellent opportunity to gain the "contractor '
s
perspective" on the business of defense acquisition. One officer
with particularly strong feelings stated that;
From all that I saw while at TWI... it does not pay to do
business with the U.S. Government ... .It ' s almost as if
the Government is trying to put its defense contractors
out of business . When we're (the Government) wrong, we
might apologize , eventually. But if the contractor is
wrong, we slam him hard and we do it immediately.
One senior officer, the deputy chief of a procurement
directorate at a major buying command, said that there was no
substitute for the type and breadth of experience gained from the
TWI program. He stated further that all of the positions for
captains and majors in his directorate were "coded for TWI
graduates" and that he actively sought out officers who had come
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from TWI.
Another, less senior officer had this to say about his TWI
experience;
It all boils down to knowing your adversary and the
political games he plays. Most of the time he (the
contractor) knows how much money you've got in your
budget for whatever it is you're buying before you even
sit down to negotiate. He knows this because some
(Congressional ) staffer from his home state told him.
...and that's the figure he's going to use, regardless of
what a fair and reasonable price is. TWI can help you
get inside his decision cycle .. .you may not win but at
least you know how he's thinking.
Of the twenty percent of officers who had participated in the
TWI program, over half expressed a need for experience at a buying
command before participating in TWI. All of these officers were
careful to not denigrate their TWI experience, but they were
insistent that TWI would have been enhanced if they had some buying
experience before participating . The general feeling was summed up
by this comment from a TWI participant; "I had no contracting
knowledge base to draw on since TWI was my first assignment as a
97... I should have gotten some experience as a buyer first and
then gone to TWI."
4. ARE COMPUTER SKILLS CRITICAL ?
Fifty percent of the interviewees responded that computer
skills were not critical. The preponderance of feeling was that
computer skills were certainly "helpful" but that a lack of such
would not be crippling. Opined one officer serving as a the chief
of a buying team at an AMC major subordinate command;
Computers aren't necessary at the buyer's level. There's
53
usually a civilian on your team that knows his way around
a computer. We've got too many computers anyway. We
issue them before we really know what it is we want to do
with them.
Forty-two percent stated that indeed, computer skills were
absolutely critical. Furthermore, these officers elaborated by
defining exactly what they meant by computer skills. A contracting
officer would certainly be less than efficient they said, if he
did not, or could not, keep his own database on either Lotus 123 or
DBASE IV; if he was unfamiliar with the techniques of spreadsheet
generation and analysis; if he was unfamiliar with the latest
version of WordPerfect; and if he could not employ the computer,
himself, to do such tasks as the generation of weighted guidelines,
the running of regression analysis models, the researching of,
clauses in the Federal Acquisition Regulation and creation of
business clearance memoranda. The prevailing opinion amongst these
officers was that the contracting arena, along with business in
general, is becoming more and more automated; for an FA 97 officer
to deny this reality and fail to equip himself to deal with it
would be a mistake of career limiting proportion. A senior officei
remarked that;
We're slaves to the computer in these types (buying
commands) of organizations . Your progress and your
evaluation are measured by computer reports. . .if they're
not accurate its your fault. I don't want to hear that
some report is messed up because the one guy who could
use a computer was sick that day .. .everyone better know
how to make the computer work for them.
Only eight percent of the interviewees stated that computer
skills had not been important in their FA 97 assignments thus far,
and that they did not foresee them becoming so. Both officers.
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asserted that computer skills belonged to the "technicians" and
that as senior officers their' s was the realm of "planning, " not
"pecking at a keyboard.
"
5. IS A KNOWLEDGE OF REGULATIONS CRITICAL ?
All twenty-four of the officers interviewed responded to this
question with the answer that a "thorough understanding" of the
regulations is absolutely critical . Not one of them intimated in
any way that the ability " to quote chapter and verse" would be
anything but counterproductive , as one officer said "its too easy
to misquote the FAR. . . to quote only bits and pieces. . . and usually
completely out of the context of what you're quoting really means."
The overwhelming opinion was that a "thorough familiarity"
means "knowing exactly where to look." Explained one interviewee;
...if you're quoting regulations to me, I'm not going to
trust you completely. What I'm looking for is the
ability, when confronted with a contracting situation, to
recognize that certain statutory or regulatory provisions
apply, know where to find them, and then use them the way
they were intended to be used. . .a contracting officer
should be able to focus contract problems in terms of FAR
elements.
Forty percent of the interviewees stated that regulatory
provisions dealing with contract changes and modifications were
perhaps the most important of all. When pressed for a definition
of "regulatory provisions, " the following were presented: Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) , Department of Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) , Armed Services Pricing
Manual (ASPM)
,
guidance from the office of Eleanor Spector, Army
FAR Supplement (AFARs), and any supplements issued by the major
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subordinate command.
One senior officer expressed the opinion that it was bordering
on "impracticability of performance" for a contracting officer tc
know everything about all of the rules and regulations governing
procurement. But it certainly was not impossible, he went on tc
say , for a contracting officer to be aware of all the provisions in
the FAR and his Service' s regulations that affected whatever type
of procurement he happened to be doing. An officer doing small
purchases "should be an expert in small purchase (regulatory)
provisions .. . one working on a major system should be the same ii.
his area..." Another senior officer expressed it thusly; "...its
like being a lawyer .. .most lawyers don't quote case law off of the
tops of their heads, but they sure have the references and they
damn sure know where to look..."
6. ARE NEGOTIATION SKILLS CRITICAL ?
Seventy-one percent responded that the ability to negotiate
was critical to effectiveness as a contracting officer. Said onej
senior officer; "If you can't negotiate; you can't be a contracting
officer...you're effectively dead in the water." Said another ii
a more forceful manner, "the desire to exercise power over othen
is one trait of a successful manager .. .negotiating skills are ont
way to employ this power . . . " This same interviewee continued that
"...at the 0-3/0-4 level you have got to be your own expert or yoi
don't have any credibility. If you're not the expert then you ent
up depending on other people and they end up being the expert, no\
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you . "
All of the officers who had participated in the TWI program
(twenty percent) responded that negotiating skill was critical
.
Each one of them also emphasized that they felt they were better
negotiators because of their TWI experience. Said one buying team
chief about the value of his TWI experience in giving him an edge
in negotiations; "...my basic understanding of the problems that
contractors face and the kinds of tricks they play to win contracts
has been invaluable when it comes to sitting down across the table
from them now.
"
When asked to express what "negotiating skills" meant, these
officers invariably stated that negotiations was "ninety percent
preparation and ten percent talk." All of them emphasized that all
of the business skills discussed by this researcher were critical
in developing the ability to negotiate . It was a rare individual
,
they said, who could bluff his way through without really knowing
what he was talking about.
Twenty-one percent responded that the ability to negotiate was
not particularly critical . It certainly would not hurt, went the
general line of reasoning, to be able to negotiate, but the lack of
such skill was not especially detrimental . Two officers, both part
of this percentage group and both from the same command, stated
that they felt that negotiations were largely personality driven,
i.e.; "...(you) don't train specifically for these skills. Some
people just read other people better. " One officer summarized the
attitude of this body of opinion when he said that he knew he was
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a weak negotiator but that this weakness did not concern him, as
even in situations where he was the "chief negotiator" because he
"always had someone else do the talking for me."
Eight percent of the interviewees declined to express an
opinion, citing lack of experience.
7 . WHAT TYPES OF MANAGERIAL SKILLS ARE CRITICAL ?
a. WRITING AND BRIEFING SKILLS.
All of the officers interviewed expressed the opinion that\
writing skills were critical to success in the FA 97 arena.
Only eight percent stated that they thought that briefing
skills were important
.
The prevailing attitude concerning the necessity for a
contracting officer to be able to express himself in a concise and
unambiguous manner was summarized in this manner; " (Writing
skills) .. .are standard issue in an officer's bag of tricks. All
officers for that matter, but especially FA 97 officers, should be
able to speak and write the Leavenworth English.
"
Twelve percent of this group, all senior officers
,
specifically mentioned the effectiveness of the Combined Arms And
Services Staff School (CAS3) at Ft Leavenworth, Kansas. These
officers said it was obvious to them which of their subordinates
had been to CAS3 and which had not.
The most frequently cited justifications for the criticality
of being able to communicate effectively with both the written and
spoken word, other than the fact that it is a skill that every
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citizen ought to possess
,
(though that has long since ceased as
being taken for granted) , are listed here in no particular order:
Writing contract documentation memoranda
Writing Justification & Approval documents
Formal written correspondence with contractors
Writing briefing papers on contract status for superiors
b. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT.
One hundred percent of the respondents stated that yes, of
course, leadership skills are important in any type of job with
supervisory responsibility, and doubly so in most military jobs by
their very nature and that FA 97 assignments were no exception.
Sixty-three percent however, distinguished between the
"leadership skills" of the type exercised in a troop environment
and the "management skills" they felt they employed working in an
overwhelmingly civilian environment. They were quick to point out
that "things are managed but people are led." The remaining
thirty-seven percent said that there was little distinction between
leadership and management; that it was just a "matter of
semantics . " One interviewee remarked that by the time an officer
makes it to an FA 97 assignment , considering all of the time-in-
service, and educational and other requirements , they had
undoubtedly already proven themselves adept at
leadership/management and that this issue should be a moot one.
Officers who had somehow made it to this point without the
requisite leadership ability and/or management skill were
59
exceptions to the rule and had "slipped through the cracks., but
the (officer evaluation) system would eventually catch up with
them.
"
Fully one third of the interviewees said that they did not
have a difficult time making the transition from a troop
environment to the administrative one of a FA 97 assignment , but
that their perception was that combat arms officers had a very
difficult time. These officers, because of the lack of women in
their basic branches and the dearth of opportunities for gaining
experience working with civilians, were subjected to a more severe
"culture shock than their noncombat arms brethren." The
interviewees who were combat arms officers though, stated that they
did not encounter any more than the usual amount of difficulty in
going from one duty assignment to another. In fact, one combat
arms officer with ten years troop experience, and not a day of it
with women or civilians, said that the management and leadership
skills he used in his FA 97 assignments were ".. .basically the same
.." as in his troop assignments, just that he had to "...be more
polite when dealing with civilians."
Thirty-eight percent responded that there was a definite "lack
of a sense of urgency amongst the civilian workforce in general."
A few officers attributed the perceived difficulty in making the
transition to the contracting environment to this lack of urgency
One officer illustrated his point by saying that "I was used to
going one hundred miles-an-hour when I was in a unit, but here
we're restricted to the federally imposed fifty-five mile-an hour
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limit."
The thirty-seven percent of respondents who made no
distinction between leadership and management expressed the overall
opinion that it was simply "a matter of getting people to do what
you want them to do, " that different people are motivated in
different ways and that, "just like they teach in all of the basic
(branch) courses, " management I leadership is a matter of recognizing
this and applying the "correct style of leadership.
"
One major buying command has recognized this initial
transition period as a potential problem, as one officer told this
researcher that he was scheduled to attend a week-long course in
how to manage civilians . The purpose of the course he said, was to
inform him about the different personnel rules that govern the
civilian workforce . He added that the two he was most concerned
about were the ones he thought would be most different from a troop
unit, that is, overtime, compensatory time and grievance
procedures
.
One senior officer, with a past tour as the commander of a
major contracting agency, said that the age-old military adage
"Mission first, men always," served him well no matter who he was
leading/managing . He continued that your workforce is "your men,
"
regardless of its make up; the mission is always there to be
accomplished, "you just have to approach it in a different way."
8. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS ?
Sixty-three percent of the interviewees are not currently
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members of the acquisition corps. The predominant feeling
expressed to this researcher was that the acquisition corps "is the
domain of the 51's," (FA 51, Research and Development) and that
"there is nothing in it for the 97's." Amongst the officers who
are not members of the corps, and even some who are, there is
widespread uncertainty about the future career ramifications of
becoming a member. Two senior officers, both the military deputy
chief of the procurement directorate at their respective command' s,
said that they were confused about whether the acquisition corps
would force FA 97's into "the PM side of the house." One had this
to say about the AAC , " There are too many misconceptions floating
around. . .there' s not enough information out there (about the AAC)
for my guys (junior officers) to make intelligent decisions about
whether they want to be members or not." He went on to say that,
"I think 97's are afraid to join because we're afraid of being
locked into PM slots .. .is the acquisition corps going to let me be
a 97 or force me into the program side of the house ?" Another
senior officer stated his feeling in this manner; "The acquisition
corps is not going to work... it's going to be a billpayer for the
drawdown. . .the acquisition corps is for civilians, not officers."
A major in an AMC MSC summarized the general feeling when he said;
...51's are in charge, they're running the show and they
think that they are the only ones qualified to be in the
AAC . . .So we're members (the 97's) but we're not
players .. .1 'm frustrated, (as a 97 in the AAC), because
I don't see a future out there. Need evidence ? Just
look at the last two PM lists.
For the thirty-seven percent of the officers who are members
of the acquisition corps, their attitude was captured by the
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interviewee who said;
The Army Acquisition Corps is a good concept , it makes a
lot of sense when you look at it... but the Army has a
poor track record of protecting people who join a program
such as the AAC when in later months the program is no
longer important and there is suddenly this group of
officers with this skill that is no longer needed.
C. SUMMARY
The background data on the officers interviewed and their
responses to the questions were presented in this chapter. The
proceeding chapter will provide some insight as to why some of the
interviewees answered the way they did and why the prevailing
attitudes and opinions may exist. Additionally, the reasons for
the appearance of a number of the technical skills that were




The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the underlying
reasons for the answers this researcher received in response to the
research questions posed and to examine the significance of the
opinions expressed in this study for the Amy's system of educating
and training its Functional Area 97 officers
.
The most critical technical skills will be explored first,
followed by the most critical managerial skills. Next will be a
discussion of the most expedient method of transferring this base
of technical and managerial skills to FA 97 officers* Finally, a
brief exposition of the ecumenical opinion of FA 97 officers in the
field on the import of the Army Acquisition Corps will be
presented.
B. MOST CRITICAL TECHNICAL SKILLS
1 . Knowledge of the Regulations
There was no doubt as to the criticality of the skill of
being able to navigate successfully over all of the regulatory
rocks and statutory shoals that the myriad of laws and regulations
present to a contracting officer; all of the interviewees responded
that this was indeed so. What this researcher was able to garner
though, was that the field of contracting and its corresponding
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statutory guidelines is immense to the point that an FA 97 officer
can only hope to be an expert in the particular field of
contracting that he is presently working in. This field of
expertise is commensurate with the officer's length of service and
experience in contracting. The most efficient way to learn the
regulations is to deal with them as they apply to the specific type
of contracting being done. As experience is gained, along with
greater responsibility and breadth of assignments, so to is
confidence and knowledge of the laws that govern every aspect of
what FA 97 officers do.
There was a recognizable correlation to this researcher
between those officers who professed to be computer literate and
those who claimed more than a passing familiarity with the FAR.
This can be attributed to the software versions of the FAR that
make its provisions instantly accessible and easily employed by
those who have the skill to use it. The use of computers and the
criticality of computer literacy will be discussed in a later part
of this section on critical technical skills.
2. General Business Sense
It is not surprising to this researcher that eighty percent
of the respondents stated that "a good business sense" is the most
critical skill required of an FA 97 officer. The difficulty lies
in the refinement of what exactly the phrase "good business sense"
encompasses . It became apparent that the phrase held different
shades of meaning for different officers. Some officers emphasized
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the technical side of business skill, e.g. accounting, while others
emphasized the managerial aspect, e.g. "people skills."
There can be little doubt that the educational background
and assignment history of each officer interviewed played a large
role in shaping the attitude of the answers and opinions he
provided. Those officers who held masters degrees tended to
emphasize the criticality of such in addition to the technical
skills of the sort derived from a formal school environment. Those
officers who did not have masters degrees though, tended to
downplay their importance to the point of implying, or so this
researcher thought , that they were not really necessary; "nice to
have," of course, but certainly not "necessary."
Thus, the close proximity of the percentage of those
officers with masters degrees, seventy- five percent, and the
percentage of officers who felt that a good business sense was the
most critical skill, eighty percent; a difference of only two
officers
.
3. Specialized Accounting Skill
The eighteen percent of interviewees who insisted that
specialized accounting skills were critical all came from
backgrounds of specialized accounting knowledge and application
j
themselves. All professed an extra interest in the various fields
of accounting and all had expended no small amount of personal
effort in increasing their accounting skills above that level which
was average for their peers. All of these officers had advanced
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degrees in business administration and all but one were serving in
positions of senior supervisory responsibility
.
Based on the number of years of combined experience in all
facets of the FA 97 career field and the authority with which these
officers speak, derived from the positions they presently hold,
their feelings about "advanced" accounting skill, beyond that which
is implied by the phrase "general business skill," contain merit.
These officers expressed an opinion which is consistent
with those who claim that the contracting officer must be his own
expert, for two primary reasons. First, the contracting officer is
the one with whom the final decision authority rests, he can seek
advice and counsel from others, but must rely on his own expertise
since it is his own decision. Secondly, a long held maxim of
military leadership is that to lead effectively, an officer must
not only be able to do everything required of his subordinates , but
that he must also be able to do it better. Thus an FA 97 officer,
who can anticipate various supervisory responsibilities , from chief
of a buying team to head of a contracting agency, must be the
master of those skills his subordinates are required to have.
Foremost among these are accounting and accounting related skills.
When asked, all of the other interviewees stated that
advanced accounting skill, qualification as a Certified
Professional Accountant for example, would contribute in great
degree to job performance and effectiveness . Not one however,
beyond the eighteen percent discussed above, thought that this
skill was feasible to obtain, given career path time constraints,
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or described it as even "highly desirable,"
4. No Particular Skill
It was surprising to this researcher that two officers
answered that no skill in particular was especially critical for F/
97 officers . There are probably few functional areas in the Army
that require the breadth and diversity of abilities as does FA 97.
Perhaps because of their relatively junior status in the
contracting field, these two officers have not yet had the numbei
of different assignments necessary for the formation of a stronc
opinion. Possibly, both officers could have felt overwhelmed bj
the incredible demand made on their abilities daily, and felt that
everything is important to such a degree that no one single skilj
could be identified.
5. Communications Skill
The eight percent of officers answering in this regard an\
very senior with a multitude of command and supervisory assignmenti
m their careers thus far. Both officers have extensivt
negotiating experience and one has a significant amount of time ii
high-level
,
policy making positions . It is reasonable that i
contracting officer with a preponderance of supervisory assignmenti
and policy making experience would emphasize the criticality o:\
communications skill. Communications skill might too, particularly
in the command and policy making environments , encompass th<
political ramifications of dealing with all of the disparati
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players in a command or headquarters organization while trying to
forge consensus to facilitate mission accomplishment
.
6. Contract Law
Although only four percent of the interviewees responded
that they thought contract law was the most critical knowledge
factor in an FA 97 officer's skill base, the majority of
respondents did mention, at some time during the course of their
interview, that a thorough familiarity with contract law and the
applicable regulatory guidelines were among the most critical of
the technical aspects of the overall skill base of a contracting
officer.
This researcher detected an undercurrent of distrust of
civilian contractors in the opinions expressed by the interviewees
in that there was a heavy emphasis on the provisions in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation and other regulations that dealt with
protests and contract termination procedures . The general attitude
was one characterized by the sense that, given the chance, most
civilian contractors will protest an award merely to be spiteful
,
regardless of whether or not they may have a legitimate complaint
.
More insidious though, is the trap that awaits an unprepared and
unarmed contracting officer in the guise of a termination. Whether
it is for default or one for the convenience of the Government , a
termination improperly handled can "ruin" a contracting officer.
Although only a few interviewees professed any direct involvement
with termination actions, the majority expressed a general feeling
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of foreboding at the possibility of having to deal with them.
When pressed for specifics , most of the interviewees coulc
only provide sketchy generalities of termination actions they hac
heard of from fellow contracting officers. This leads this
researcher to believe that t iese amorphous f yet' forceful,
expressions of the greed of civilian contractors is anothei
manifestation of the "adversarial relationship" between the
Government and its contract suppliers. The phrase most often used,
indeed so much so that it is now a cliche in contracting circles,
to describe those parts of the FAR and other regulations which are
most important to contracting officers, is "tell me what I need tc
know about them to stay out of jail." It follows then, that witl
an attitude that in its most favorable light can be described at
"adversarial," contracting officers would be most interested in thi
provisions of the regulations describing penalties for contracting
transgressions . Yet, not a single officer interviewed by thid
researcher could name an associate who had ever run afoul of any 01
the regulations and/or statutory provisions to the point of beinc
charged, convicted and incarcerated.
It is this researcher' s observation that there are two mail
influences on the opinions of FA 97 officers: (1) officials in thi
formal school environment and, (2) peers and supervisors o:
contracting officers . More than one interviewee stated that thi
"schoolhouse did a good job of teaching the regulations, " and thai
as part of that process , emphasized the provisions which spell oui
what is prohibited, forbidden, not allowed, illegal, unethical
,
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etc. Combine this educational experience with the institutional
opinion of the contracting profession, which is historically one of
mistrust of the contractor, reinforce it with a barrage of
headlines and investigations of procurement fraud and contractor
greed, and it is not surprising that so many officers feel the way
they do about knowing the regulations
.
Although only four percent stated that acquiring expertise
in contract law was the most critical skill, seventy-one percent
mentioned at some time during the course of their interview that
"Understanding contract law, " was a skill contributing to the
development of a sound business background. This is understandable
in the context of the fact that fifty percent mentioned the need to
be equipped to deal with contract protests and terminations . This
researcher observed however, that few of the interviewees had any
direct experience with contract disputes actions. The overall
impression gained from the context of the interviews was that for
those officers expressing the need for expertise in the area of
"legal proprieties, " the reason for such was the impression gained




Empirical skills are those skills which require a working
familiarity with the fundamentals of algebra and calculus and a
basic knowledge of statistical theory. Included in this category
of skills are tasks such as constructing a learning curve,
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performing basic regression analysis, and conducting an analysis of
a contractor' s proposal based on predetermined criteria.
This researcher is surprised by the low frequency of
mention of the skills that pertain directly to financial and cost
accounting skills and general empirical ability. For example, only
seventeen percent mentioned "Understanding Cost Accounting
Standards, " and only four percent mentioned "Understand a
contractor' s disclosure statement." It is the opinion of this
researcher that the low frequency of mention of specific
empirically related skills is directly attributable to the fact
that only eighteen percent of the interviewees stated that any
specialized accounting expertise was necessary. This same eighteen
percent accounts for the identification of the majority of tht
specific skills that were named by four or less interviewees
.
If eighty percent of the interviewees stated that a "strong
business background" was critical to success as an FA 97, why did
only eighteen percent insist on in-depth accounting expertise,
heavily empirically oriented skill ? This researcher believes that
each officer's own definition of the phrase "a good business sense'
determines, in large part, his opinion of the best way to acquire
it and of what comprises it. The very senior officers witl
experience in program offices and in command positions tended tc
stress the need for advanced skill. The junior level officers witl
limited FA 97 experience, i.e. in their first assignment as an FJ
97, and working in organizations comprised primarily of civiliai
contract series personnel (GS 1102), tended to downplay tht
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technical aspects and skills of contracting and emphasize the
managerial and leadership skills. This can be attributed to the
limited scope of their experiences thus far and the necessarily
narrow horizons of a contract specialist . As was expressed to this
researcher, the presence of qualified civilians , expert in such
skills as cost analysis and assembling solicitation documents,
tends to downplay the need for the FA 9 7 officer himself to be
expert in these particular skills.
It should still come as no surprise though, that of the
skills requiring empirical ability, accounting was the field most
heavily emphasized by the FA 97 officers who participated in this
study. This validates what is inherently obvious in that the
ability to understand a contractor' s cost collection and assignment
system along with the ability to decipher balance sheets and
statements of cash flow to gain a picture of the contractor'
s
financial health, is fundamental to dealing with him as either a
procuring contracting officer or as an administrative contracting
officer. The more skilled a contracting officer may be in
financial and cost accounting, the better armed he is to make an
initial judgement of a contractor' s financial health, evaluate any
proposals received and then make a determination for award followed
by successful administration of the resulting contract
.
This researcher believes that a principal reason for the
lack of very strong emphasis on empirical skills in general and
specialized accounting skills in particular, is the widespread lack
of such skills in the overall officer population. The majority of
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junior officers are not required to perform duties at the
Lieutenant and Captain level in their basic branches that require
any great degree of analytical mathematical ability. It follows
then, that when an FA 97 is fortunate enough to be selected for
advanced civil schooling (ACS) , the rigors of the empirically
oriented graduate program of study make a lasting impression and
may cause him to change his opinion about what he considers
critical . This phenomenon is perhaps equally true for the officer
who may go straight to a buying command in an initial FA 97
assignment and is there exposed to the intensely empirically
oriented contracting environment. This depends in large measure
however, on the presence of civilian staff "experts" who may
perform the majority of the very technical work.
For the twenty percent of officers who did not assert that
empirical skills were the most critical
,
perhaps they did so out of
being put off by the need to acquire an alien and demanding, yet
undeniably essential , skill base while tenuously relying on the
skills of others to avoid facing their own shortcomings.
8. Computer Skills
Except for one senior officer, the feeling about the
criticality of computer skill broke down almost exactly by the age
of the interviewee, i.e. the older the officer, the less emphasis
he placed on computer skills; the younger the officer, the more he
felt that computer skills were necessary. This is perhaps a common
phenomenon in the business world in general . The older workers,
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ones of a previous generation, either resist new and intimidating
technologies outright or only grudgingly accept them, often times
not making full use of their applicability . The more youthful
workers however , who have been exposed to new technologies at an
earlier age, are much more receptive to their use in the workplace
because they are not intimidated by what they view as an
indispensable aid.
A few officers, running the gamut of the rank structure,
recognized early on that computer technology was going to become
more and more prevalent in the contracting workplace and have
developed computer skills that far exceed the basic familiarity
that most others have. These few are a definite minority and are
likely to remain so as their desire to acquire advanced computer
skills is fueled as much by personal interest as it is by
professional requirements
.
The need for a basic level of computer literacy came across
very strongly regardless of generational motivational differences
.
What also came across to this researcher was the need to adopt a
standard set of computer software throughout all of the Army
Material Command. A standard wordprocessing program, database and
spreadsheet manager, and graphics program would improve
communications and efficiency not only throughout AMC , but within
major subordinate commands as well. In some instances two offices
that share a common wall may not have any computer
interchangability as both are using different software.
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The Army and its corps of acquisition professionals can
anticipate a corresponding increase in the numbers of computer
skilled officers as those entering the service at this point have
probably been working with computers in some form or another since
grade school* This increase in the pool of knowledgeable and\
enthusiastic users will speed the automation that is sweeping all
aspects of the business world , Government contracting certainly not
withstanding. This in turn will see computer skills transition\
from a "highly desirable" category to a "highly critical" one as
the older workforce retires and is gradually replaced by successive
generations of computer literate officers until such time as the\
entire workforce depends on the computer to conduct most of the\
business of contracting.
One prescient senior officer remarked that the day was not:
far off when the entire process of solicitation , evaluation ot
bids, and awarding of contracts would all be accomplished by
computer and the sometime burdensome and onerous task of contract
modification would be accomplished with a few keystrokes at a
computer keyboard. This all foretells the day when, if in fact
they are not already so, computer skills will be a basic
prerequisite to being able to perform in functional area 97.
C. MOST CRITICAL MANAGERIAL SKILL
1 . Leadership and Management
There was universal acclaim that both leadership anc
managerial skills are absolutely critical to success in the
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contracting and industrial management career field. Most officers,
perhaps because of the intensely personal nature that develops
between an officer and his soldiers , chose to make a distinction
between the personal nature of what they defined as leadership,
i.e. "people skills , " and the distant and impersonal arena of
management, i.e. "resource skills." This researcher found the
distinction between leadership and management largely irrelevant
in the realm of Functional Area 97 because successful performance
as conveyed by the opinions of the interviewees requires equal
measures of both.
Among officers of the combat arms branches, e.g. Infantry,
Armor, etc., the term "manager" can take on insulting overtones as
it is often applied to staff officers who handle paper and not
soldiers . "Leadership, " on the other hand, instantly brings to
mind images of great military heros from wars past and the promise
of fame and conquests to come. It is illuminating that military
heros are commonly described as great leaders, not great managers,
though it is apparent that Grant, Pershing, Eisenhower, and
Schwartzkopf were all as equally endowed with managerial abilities
as they were with leadership ones.
The popular misconception that leadership and management
skills mix like oil and water aside, it is apparent that
considerable amounts of skill in "leading" an amalgamation of civil
servants towards the accomplishment of a common goal while
concurrently "managing" the resources available, time and funding
among them, are critical to the success of any FA 97. One such
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skill can not be employed with out the other. This is not to brook\
argument with those who would say that "battlefield leadership" is
an art unto itself, separate and distinct from management; in the
context considered in this thesis, leadership and a management are
{
mutually interdependent.
The discriminatory appeal of "military leadership" and its
association with the uniquely male warrior tradition does well tc
explain the difficulties expressed by combat arms officers in 1
making the transition from the aggressively male environment of a\
line unit to the more genteel and integrated environment of tht
procurement world. In this instance there are two distinct
cultures coming into direct opposition. The attitude engendered by
the mission of the combat arms branches to "close with and destroy
the enemy" is not directly transferable, applicable, or desirable
to the administrative atmosphere of the major buying commands. The
contractor, though some would claim he is indeed the enemy, is one
to be cooperated with, not destroyed. It is little wonder then,
that some officers do not initially meet with success when they try
to run their buying teams as if they were tactical units and treat
their GS-4s as if they were E-4s.
The officers who came from branches and/or jobs where theyj
had daily interaction with women and civilians expressed no great
frustration in making the transition from troop unit to contracting
office. Those officers without the benefits of this exposure did.
The "sense of urgency" and devotion to mission
accomplishment that Army officers bring to their work at
78
contracting officers should be harnessed and channeled into a
positive direction . The limitations of a workforce composed of
civil servants vice soldiers must be recognized and measures taken
to make the most of the talents and inherent benefits of the
stability and maturity of a civilian workforce* There did not
appear to be any disagreement with the assertion that the core
skills of leadership and management, practiced and sharpened
through eight years of service, transfer easily and directly to
contracting and industrial management; provided allowances are made
for what is a fundamentally different work environment.
It should also be mentioned that this researcher observed
an attitude which suggested that because military officers as a
rule are expected to "master" such an incredibly wide-ranging and
diverse set of skills throughout the course of their careers, they
actually become "expert" in only the managerial and leadership
skills and rely on the civilian experts for advice concerning the
technical skills.
Military officers are by their very nature "generalists ,
"
who are required to apply a set of commonly accepted management
techniques and leadership principles to an unending parade of
situations in an equally limitless set of disciplines and
circumstances . The constant factor holding this unwieldy equation
together is the soundness of these immutable principles of
leadership and techniques of management that are, after all,
immutable because of their universal applicability . Therein lies
the foundation for the commonly held opinion expressed to this
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researcher; that any military officer with the requisite leadership
and management skills (which have certainly been honed to a fine
edge after eight years of service) can step into almost any
contracting situation, with little introduction, and immediately
begin managing the civilian experts who practice one set of very
limited skills for their entire careers.
If this is indeed true, then there is no need for graduate
education for FA 97 officers , no need for the Training With\
Industry Program and no need for the courses offered by the'
Acquisition Enhancement Program Office (ACE) . This researcher
believes that this not the case and that the passage of DAWIA anc
the opinions of the more senior and experienced officers
interviewed herald the recognition of the requirement tc
professionalize the military acquisition workforce. There may be]
some functional areas which require no experts, merely generalists
of the ilk discussed above. Functional Area 97 is not only not om
of them, but is a functional area which requires its officer
members to be their own experts.
2. The Ability to Negotiate
Although seventy-one percent of the interviewees statec
that they considered negotiation skills to be critical, less thai,
half of them had any actual experience at the negotiating table.
That the majority came down on the side of criticality can be
attributed to a perception that this researcher observed; that
negotiations are a higher form of the verbal art and a necessary
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part of "closing the deal" in the civilian business community,
regardless of how many officers are ever faced with formal
negotiations with a contractor. Army officers necessarily practice
the art of persuasion in the discharge of their daily duties,
whether in a more open and forthright manner as might be witnessed
in a troop environment or the more subtle, though not necessarily
more gentle, manner necessary in a major buying command. Because
of what Army officers are conditioned to accept as the norm then,
and the popular conception of business consisting of "closing the
deal," the interviewees would tend to see negotiations as critical
,
regardless of whether or not they had any actual experience
negotiating.
3. Writing and Briefing Skills
The majority of interviewees did not feel that the ability
to give a polished, formal, military style briefing was critical
.
Formal briefings were rare occurrences in the experience of the
officers this researcher spoke to. If information had to be passed
along it was done so in an informal manner either in a memo or in
person through a "desk side" briefing. Only one officer said he
had made extensive use of briefing skills and that was due to what
he claimed was a combination of a natural proclivity on his part
and the information requirements Operation Desert Storm placed on
his contracting directorate.
The ability to express thoughts in a logical and concise
manner on paper was universally identified as an absolutely
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critical skill.
The Army has long recognized a serious shortfall in th
ability of its officers to write clearly and has attempted t
correct this potentially crippling defect by instituting reforms i
the way it trains its junior and midgrade officers. Ne
lieutenants are faced with English grammar and composition course
during their accession branch basic courses and captains ar
subjected to the same when they attend their advanced course a
approximately four years time in service. The most comprehensiv
part of the effort to improve writing skills is the Combined Arm
And Services Staff School (CAS3) which all captains must attend a
some point before their eighth year of service. The focus of CAS
is on developing the skills that officers of all branches will nee
in later assignments to staff positions; chief among these an
briefing and writing.
This researcher received nothing but enthusiastic response
concerning the positive effects that CAS3 was having through th
improved skills of its graduates . A number of senior officer
mentioned that they had experienced personal embarrassment at time
when one of their FA 97 officers was not able to make himsel
understood to a contractor because of the use of the stilted an
passive language that up until only recently characterized tj
Army's writing style. Fortunately, because of the remedia
measures discussed above, the Army is making progress in what wa
an area of great weakness.
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4. Ethics
This area was notable for an almost complete lack of
mention. Only one officer out of twenty-four said anything at all
about the ethical dimension of contracting and the pitfalls and
obstacles endemic to it.
An attitude similar to that discovered about certain other
skills is equally apparent concerning integrity. The military
profession inculcates its members with its unique ethical
perspective from the very moment a new officer takes his oath. A
military officer's word is his bond and nothing further need be
said. What might appear as a glaring omission to the uninitiated
is not that at all. It is the silent assent to a commonly held set
of beliefs and shared values; an officer's integrity is not so much
taken for granted as it is assumed to be a prerequisite of
membership in the organization.
Unfortunately , a Disneyesque simplification of battlefield
honor does not apply in whole or in part to the sometimes gordian
complexity of the statutes that govern the actions of contracting
and industrial management officers. Special attention must be paid
to the ethical considerations of Government contracting as there
are few, if any , direct comparisons with the less hazy distinctions
between right and wrong in the field Army. An FA 97 officer can
not rely on intuition alone as what may "feel" right is not
necessarily either legal or advisable.
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D. BEST WAY TO DEVELOP/OBTAIN SKILLS
1 , On-The Job-Training
The majority of interviewees , fifty-four percent , responded
that OJT was the most efficient way to learn the skills necessary
to function in an entry level position , e.g. contract specialist*
This opinion aligns with the preceding discussion in that it is
commonly held that military officers can pick up by "osmosis" the
skills they need while actually working in the position assigned.
Some senior officers even said that because of the ability to
"focus" on only those skills the officer needs to function on a
day-to-day basis, on-the-job training was the method of choice for
preparing the military officers for the eventual receipt of a
warrant .
It is also understandable that OJT should be the preferred
method from the perspective of the often understaffed and
overburdened contracting organizations . The common ratio of civil
servants to military officers in the organizations dealt with in
this study was approximately 50:1, Any reluctance on the part of
a supervising officer to let a position go unfilled while
prospective candidates are at various training programs, when the
officer could be filling a position and learning his job at the
same time through OJT, is therefore understandable.
The fallacy of the completeness of OJT is well borne out by
the experiences of several interviewees as related to this
researcher. The experience of one, a combat arms officer, gives
credence to the proposition that OJT is only part of the total
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education and training of an FA 97 officer. This particular
officer made the transition directly from a troop environment
,
completely unrelated to contracting, to the TWI program and thence
to a major buying command where he was in possession of an
unlimited warrant within four months of assuming his duties. By
his own admission, this officer was in no position to accept a
warrant of any amount after only three months of actual work
experience, even though he had participated in TWI. It was only
the guidance of the career civil servants on his buying team, said
this officer, that prevented him from making any major mistakes
.
The significance of the fact that fully half of the fifty-
four percent of officers who stated that OJT was the training
method of choice do not possess masters degrees, is that OJT is
indeed the method for training someone to assume a certain set of
duties with the least amount of initial investment and the shortest
time of return. This is an unfortunate and shortsighted view
however, in that it fails to take the future needs of the Army and
the career progression of the individual involved into
consideration. It merely seeks to obtain immediate, albeit
limited, results at the expense of greater investment for
correspondingly greater return. Fortunately, this researcher did
not encounter a widespread attitude of favoritism of OJT for the
sake of real time benefits for the organization of assignment at
the expense of the individual and/or the Army.
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2. Masters Degree
Although seventy-five percent of the officers involved in
this study have masters degrees, only thirty-three percent of them
said that graduate school was the best way to obtain the requisite
amount of competence needed to perform as an FA 97. Only one
respondent drew a distinction between "training" and "education,
saying that the former comes from work experience while the latter
is often best obtained in the schoolhouse
.
There appears to this researcher to be a tendency in the
Army as a whole for officers to view time in their careers spent
"away from troops" to be less than well spent, particularly when it
comes to measuring up to one's peers when competing for promotion
or selection for a senior service college. Conversely, there is;
also the recognition that an advanced degree, if not a dejure
requirement for promotion to the rank of 0-5 and above, is
certainly a defacto one. Many officers pursue graduate degrees on
their own time at their own expense, believing that they are
satisfying two requirements at one time; accumulating the right
type of experience in their specialty as well as making themselves
competitive for promotion to 0-5. This is not and cannot be the
case for officers who hold the FA 97 designation. A masters degree
in business is, if not the most critical and fundamental
educational experience of a FA 97 officer's development, then
certainly it is among the top three. (The remaining two being on-
the-job training and participation in the TWI program)
.
A minority of interviewees , thirty-three percent, claimed
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that a graduate level degree in business was critical ; the
remaining sixty-seven percent acknowledged that it was, at the very
least, highly desirable . If only one third of the military
acquisition workforce sees a masters as critical , the
implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
(DAWIA) will convince the other two thirds.
3. The Training With Industry Program
That all of the respondents were universal in their praise
of the TWI program is heartening in that officers who participate
in the program are apparently benefiting by both the experience
they gain, albeit from the "enemy camp," as well as the training
they receive in all of the various contracting and general business
skills. The military maxim that states that an officer must strive
to know his opponent is just as true and relevant at the
negotiating table as it is on the battlefield. Not that
contractors are the "enemy," but even maintaining an "arms length"
relationship requires that each side understand and have
appreciation for the motivations and operational culture of the
other.
That over half of the officers who have participated in TWI
listed it as the best way to obtain an overall set of business
skills lends weight to the strength of the program. The remainder
of participants qualified their first choices by saying that TWI
was one of the best professional experiences of their careers; but
it was not a multi-dimensional one. This point is best illustrated
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by the officers who were sent directly to TWI as their first FA 97
assignment and experienced no small amount of bewilderment and
confusion as they adjusted to the initially alien environment of
procurement. These officers were all adamant that an initial
assignment to a contracting command would have enabled them to
subsequently derive that much more out of their TWI tour , had they
the frame of reference first gained from an entry level FA 97 job,
e.g. contract specialist
.
The TWI program appears to be only a part of the totaj
preparation process for FA 97 officers . Senior officers in high
level supervisory positions did tell this researcher however, that
they actively sought out officers with TWI experience, and that ii
given an option, they would chose a TWI graduate over an officer
with a graduate degree. Their rationale was that a degree could be
obtained during off-duty time, whereas the experiences gained from
TWI could not be.
E. THE ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS
With a force reduction of twenty-five percent over the next
four years looming ever larger on the horizon, it is understandable
that there should exist some anxiety about career progression ii
the officer corps. The existence of the Acquisition Corps and its
effects on its members is largely shrouded in ignorance. The
majority of officers interviewed, regardless of rank, were ilj
informed about the purpose of the AAC and had only a very vague
picture of the career path of an AAC officer. The prevailing
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opinion is that the Corps was created for and controlled by FA 51
(research and development) officers and that FA 97 officers were
included only as an afterthought
.
There is precious little accurate information in the field
about the Acquisition Corps and what little does exist is outdated
or only partly correct. The unstable legislative climate and the
continuing drawdown make the situation even more tenuous as most
officers said that they thought the Acquisition Corps would be the
"billpayer" for the Army Material Command's share of the officer
cuts. Among the majority of the officers interviewed, whether they
were members of the Acquisition Corps or not, the prevalent feeling
was expressed as; why sign up for a program that is at best going
to be a career dead end or at worst lead only a very temporary
existence until the next "quick fix" program comes along ?
F. SUMMARY
The possible underlying reasons for why the interviewees
answered the way they did were explored in this chapter in addition
to a brief amount of background material that sheds more
understanding on the opinions of the officers who participated in
this study.
The next and final chapter will draw on its antecedent ones to
provide this researcher ' s conclusions and recommendations for the
skills, assignments, abilities and knowledge factors that should be
considered critical for a foundation of Functional Area 97 skills.
89
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions were arrived at as a result of this
study. They are divided into four sections; Section 1: technical
skills; Section 2: training, education , and experience; Section 3:
managerial skills; Section 4; the Army Acquisition Corps.
1 . Technical Skills
a . The development of "a general business sense"
is the most critical of all of the skills and
abilities neede -' for an officer to perform in
the Contracting and Industrial Management
Functional Area.
The phrase, "a general business sense" is inherently
problematic because it invokes strong, but different , images foi
different people. In this study, the common meaning of this phrase
encompassed the types of skills and enabling abilities that one
would obtain through a rigorous graduate program in businesz
administration or management. An FA 97 officer with a "gooc
business sense" is able to make the wisest business decision foi
the Government; the concerns of cost effectiveness , best value anc
meeting the needs of the end user should be foremost in his mind,
He distills the inputs from the customer and the various supporting
staffs available at the contracting organization, e.g. lawyers,
cost analysts , engineers , contract specialists , etc., and froi
their sometimes widely divergent advice, finds the common grounc
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and chooses the course of action that provides the best product at
the best price to Government while simultaneously satisfying any
congressionally mandated provisions of social policy.
More importantly however, the FA 97 officer with a
sound business sense is able to choose the wisest course of action
in the absence of any supporting staff. The FA 97 officer so
equipped is able to act as his own expert in the above named areas,
and after having gathered the necessary data, make a decision that
meets the needs of the purpose of the procurement action at no cost
of undue influence from any of the contributing factors.
b. The development of advanced ,
specialized expertise in financial
and cost accounting is highly
desirable for all FA 97 officers
.
Though the development of specialized accounting
skill beyond that which is obtainable through a normal graduate
business administration program is not critical , it is none-the-
less the most highly desirable special skill for an FA 97 officer
to possess. A basic understanding of financial and cost accounting
principles and practices is critical; the achievement of a
Certified Public Accountant ' s certificate is not. The FA 97
officer must understand how the civilian contractor operates; how
his pricing mechanisms work, how his overhead rates are calculated,
and how his costs are accumulated and accounted for. The FA 97
officer must understand and be able to communicate in accounting
terms with the functional experts on the support staff of the major
buying commands. Most importantly though, he must be able to act
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as his own expert in the absence of any functional experts or
supporting staff.
c . A thorough understanding of contract law and a
basic familiarity with all of the governing
procurement related regulations and statutory
guidelines are critical knowledge factors for
the FA 9 7 officer.
The very nature of Government contracting, in that
it is completely different from its civilian counterpart , aside
from the unique aspects brought to it from its Defense Department
cousin, demands that the professionals who deal with its
intricacies be thoroughly versed in its regulatory foundations. FA
97 officers should be familiar with the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) , its Department of the Army supplement and any
additional supplements applicable to the various major subordinat
commands
.
A "basic familiarity" entails a working knowledge ot
the contents of the FAR and an immediate intimacy with those
sections that apply to the particular area of contracting currently
in question. The ability to quote the FAR is not necessary, but
the ability to couch contracting situations in terms of the FAR anc
subsequently reference them so, is critical
.
In addition to those aspects of the body oi\
regulatory guidelines that apply to specialized areas ol
contracting, the FA 97 officer should be thoroughly versed in those
aspects that relate to the ethical considerations of Government
contracting and standards of professional conduct. The FA 9'»
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officer should also be well versed in the sections of the FAR that
deal with cost allowability and contract terminations
.
d. Computer literacy is critical for an FA 97
officer to be maximally effective
.
The generation of officers in the first wave of
accessions into the Acquisition Corps is the first for which
computer skills will be critical ones. All that those in
procurement functions do is becoming more, not less, automated.
Officers who are not computer literate are crippling their
effectiveness before they even begin their first FA 97 assignment .
At the hands of those who can command it, the computer is more than
just another management tool. It is the one tool that can free the
contracting officer from the vast of amounts of data that must be
analyzed and assimilated, and permit him to concentrate on only
those pieces of data which are most important
.
Presently, the most critical consideration is not
that all of the procurement functions in all of the buying commands
are automated, because they are certainly not. The most critical
aspect is that those officers who possess the ability to put the
computer to work for them are at a marked advantage over their
contemporaries who can not.
All FA 97 officers should possess a basic operating
knowledge of the MS Disk Operating System (MS DOS) and be versed in
these types of software: a wordprocessing program (e.g.,
Wordperfect) ; a database management program (e.g., Lotus 123 or
DBase IV); and a graphics program (e.g., Harvard Graphics)
.
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2. Training , Education, and Experience
a. Training received while working in a
Functional Area 9 7 assignment is the most
critical experience factor for an FA 97
officer.
Training received while on the job is the most
efficient way to take officers from the various basic branches and
give them an immediate grasp of the "how to" of contracting and
industrial management. The ability of the immediate supervisor or
the officer's mentor in the contracting organization to focus
exclusively on those tasks that must be performed to accomplish the
mission on a daily basis gives on-the-job training the quickest
return for the minimal investment of time and resources.
On-the-job training falls short however, in
preparing the FA 97 officer for the assumption of greater
responsibility at correspondingly greater levels of skill and
ability. OJT does not address the "why" of contracting and
industrial management in any coherent or uniform fashion, nor does
it present the FA 97 officer with a sound understanding of the
entire procurement and acquisition system.
The FA 97 officer should be provided with an initial
assignment of short duration in a buying organization. As
previously discussed, OJT is sufficient to prepare the Acquisition
Corps FA 97 officer to assume limited duties in a short amount of
time, preferably as a buyer or a contract specialist on a buying
team. The significance of the initial FA 97 assignment being made
to a buying command vice the Training With Industry program (TWI)
or graduate school, is the institutional reference framework that
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this first FA 97 assignment will provide. The reference framework
obtained here will significantly enhance the value of graduate
education, and later participation in the TWI program, as the
officer student /TWI participant will possess a framework against
which to evaluate and measure all that is experienced in graduate
school and TWI.
b. The achievement of a masters degree
in business administration or
management is critical for the
continued success and career
viability of the FA 97 officer.
A masters degree is not immediately necessary for
successful functioning as an FA 97 officer. It is, however, the
most expedient means of imparting an understanding of the business
environment as a whole to the FA 97 officer along with the
fundamental skills in the basic disciplines of business . Most
significantly, it is the only vehicle through which FA 97 officers
gain an appreciation for the theory, vice the practice, of business
skills
.
Not only is a masters degree essential for continued
competitiveness for promotion to grades of 0-5 and above, it is
also a recognized means of developing a facility for critical
thinking that prepares the officer for positions of greater
responsibility and authority. Additionally, the educational
improvement provisions of the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act (DAWIA) mandate that AAC officers have a masters
degree for certification to fill "critical" acquisition positions
.
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c . Participation in the Training With Industry
Program is highly desirable for all FA 97
officers
.
There exists no program other than TWI , which gives
FA 97 participants a better perspective on Government-industry
relations and the dynamics of that relationship in regard to
contracting. Unfortunately , TWI slots are limited and, like the
fully funded advanced civil schooling program, participating
officers are removed from regular duties for the length of the]
program. However, the return on the investment in time and
resources to send an officer to train with industry is an
exceptionally large one. The framework of reference that is gained
through TWI is extremely valuable in the dividends that it pays
through future dealings with civilian contractors in negotiations
as well as the invaluable understanding of the operations and\
mindset of the civilian partner in the contractual relationship
.
Functional Area 97 officers should be sent to TWI as
positions permit, but only after having served an initial
assignment in a major buying command. The TWI program should not
serve as an educational vehicle in lieu of the fully funded masters
program
.
After all FA 97 officers have served their initial
FA 97 assignments they should then be sent to obtain a masters
degree in business administration. The assumption is that all FA
97 officers at this point are fully qualified for selection for TWI
and/ or ACS and equally competitive for promotion. Those officers
not afforded the opportunity to attend ACS because of timing
96
problems or other career considerations should progress to TWI
,
where they should be posted long enough to allow them to obtain a
masters degree during their off duty hours. In this manner all FA
97 officers would be cycled through the educational , training and
experience programs that will provide them with the critical
training , experience and education assignments which they require




a . The ability to negotiate is critical for FA 97
officers.
Although an FA 97 officer can not be assured of
involvement in negotiations during an initial FA 97 tour, he can
expect that eventually
,
perhaps as the chief of a buying team, that
he will be directly involved in some type of negotiations with
contractor personnel
.
Some officers might be predisposed because of
personality to be better negotiators, but the ability to negotiate
is like any other in that it requires much practice to be
developed. All FA 97 officers should take advantage of whatever
opportunities exist to improve their negotiating skill. The
educational experience of a graduate program may provide some
background theory on the conduct of negotiations; participation in
TWI may present the opportunity to observe actual negotiations from
the contractor' s perspective; working in an FA 97 position in a
major buying command should present the FA 97 officer with the
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opportunity to observe and actively participate in negotiations.
The most important part of the development of
negotiating skill is the mastery of all of the foundation skills
discussed in this thesis, as the preparation before the actual
negotiating begins is the most critical phase of the entire
process . Once an FA 97 officer has mastered the skills needed tc
prepare a negotiating position he can then work on honing the
actual face-to-face component of the negotiating skill.
Confidence in the art of negotiating can only be
developed through the competence achieved by being thoroughly
grounded in the basics of contracting and general business
principles . Participation in mock negotiations, every bit as
brutal as the real thing, is the only sure method to achiev
mastery of this critical, yet elusive, skill.
b. The ability to present a formal military style
briefing is highly desirable
.
The presentation of formal military briefings is not
widespread throughout the FA 97 community , therefore it is not
absolutely critical that FA 97 officers be able to do so. However,
an FA 97 officer who is an accomplished briefer is certainly at aL
advantage over those of his colleagues who are not. The self-
confidence engendered by the ability to successfully present a
formal military briefing will carry over into all other aspects oi
performing the duties of an FA 97 officer.
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c.
The ability to express thoughts in writing in
a clear and concise manner is critical for
functioning as an FA 97 officer.
The ability to write effectively is a critical skill
in many job specialties throughout the Army; and it is particularly
so for FA 97 assignments . FA 9 7 officers can expect to deal
primarily with people who are not fellow Army officers and who do
not understand military jargon. Relations with civilian
contractors require formal written correspondence and the FA 97
officer must have the ability to compose such correspondence . He
can not rely on a secretary or member of a supporting staff to do
his writing for him, as in many instances there are neither
secretaries nor staff.
It is already a requirement for all captains from
year group 79 and forward to attend the Combined Arms and Services
Staff School. Attendance at this highly effective school and
completion of a masters program will go far in strengthening the
writing abilities of all officers
.
d. All FA 97 officers must be both accomplished
leaders and motivators of people and skilled
managers of resources.
Because accession into the Acquisition Corps does
not take place until after the eighth year of service, most FA 97
officers will have already developed the requisite leadership and
management skills through their various assignments in their basic
branches . The officer evaluation system will have identified those
officers who lack these aforementioned abilities and will have
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processed them out of the system before such time as they woulc
seek to be considered for acceptance into the AAC.
4. The Army Acquisition Corps
a
.
The Army Acquisition Corps has not been well
received by officers in the contracting field.
There is widespread confusion and apprehensioi
concerning the advancement opportunities for FA 97 's in the Corpt
vice those for FA 51' s and the possibility for selection as <
program manager as well as eligibility for selection for commani
positions . There exists a general feeling in the field that tht
AAC will be a career graveyard; offering little advancement
opportunity for its members who will languish from an inevitable
lack of support once the AAC is superseded by more pressing and
timely concerns . FA 97 officers are seen as a necessary burdenA
caught halfway between being part of the AAC and still remaining
loyal to their basic branches .
b. It is absolutely essential to the viability of
the defense procurement function that military
officers continue to play a significant role
in the business of defense acquisition.
There is no link between the end user in the fieli
and the buyer at the contracting organization more important oi
more immediately concerned than the uniformed FA 97 officer. T<
take away the FA 97 officer from procurement would be to remove tht
"muddy boots" perspective that provides a reality check on tht
process of acquisition; deny the field Army of its ont
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representative , who, by his very uniformed presence, serves as a
constant reminder of what the real purpose of defense procurement
is; purge the procurement environment of its source of empathy for
the soldier in the field, empathy that civilian professionals can
not provide; and eliminate the origin from which a genuine sense of




Focus the Army Acquisition Corps on the skills most
critical for FA 9 7 success.
The Acquisition Corps must necessarily concentrate its
collective efforts on those technical and managerial skills which
have been established here as being most critical to performance as
an FA 97 officer. The atmosphere of reductions , cutbacks, and
drawdowns will not allow for the survival of such a corps of
professionals unless they are focused only on what is most
important and what has been shown to offer the highest return on
the Army's investment of time and money.
2 Establish a transition course to facilitate the
integration of basic branch officers into the new
environment of their initial FA 97 assignment.
Because of the very unique environment of contracting and
industrial management, i.e. the presence of a majority of civilians
and the administrative atmosphere, there should be a local course
at each of the major subordinate commands of the Army Material




This transition course should concentrate on the
specifics of the civil service system and how to cooperate
successfully with a predominantly civilian workforce. It should
touch on subjects where there is the greatest diversity between
troop units and the buying commands. These areas include: dealing
with unions, grievance procedures, termination of civilian
employees , overtime, sexual harassment , etc.
3
.
Integrate all Functional Area 97 Officers into the
Army Acquisition Corps.
Functional Area 97 is not a functional area which lends
itself to a dual track career path. The technical nature and ever
changing defense procurement environment of FA 97 requires that its
officers should specialize in it and it alone. If FA 97 officers
are to be an important asset to the Acquisition Corps and play a
significant role, then they need to be full members and not be left
in the fuzzy world of multi-track career possibilities
.
4 Allow only certified Acquisition Corps members to
compete for procurement command positions.
If the Army Acquisition Corps is to fulfill its mandate
to provide the nation with its cadre of professional acquisition
officers, then there must exist sufficient incentive to attract the
brightest and best qualified officers to its ranks. Once all
current FA 97 officers are members of the AAC and designation of FA
97 for officers in the future automatically means inclusion in the
AAC, then these centrally selected procurement commands should be
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the career capping assignments that FA 97 officers make as their
goals
.
5 . Select officers for Program Manager and
Product Manager positions on the basis of
those best qualified, regardless of functional
area designation.
For the Acquisition Corps to achieve long term viability
and for FA 97 ' s to play a fully integrated role, they should not be
discriminated against for selection for program/product management
positions
.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
a. How did the current state of the Army contracting
officer and the Army Acquisition Corps come to be ?
Chapter III, Background, covers the history of
acquisition legislative reform from the beginning of the last
decade to the present . In this atmosphere of indignation at the
excesses of the defense establishment , the Congress culminated its
efforts of revamping the defense procurement system with the
passage of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act. This
legislation mandates the creation of Acquisition Corps within each
of the Armed Services and has set the stage of procurement for both
military and civilian acquisition professionals well into the 21st
Century.
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b. What are the requirements for FA 97 officers as
mandated by the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act ?
The provisions of DAWIA as implemented by the Office of
the Proponent of Functional Area 97 include the complete
integration of Functional Area 97 into the Army Acquisition Corps
and the institution of a single track career path for FA 97
officers as members of the AAC.
Additionally, DAWIA has caused the centrally selected
procurement commands to be restricted to only those officers who
are members of the AAC. Long an area of contention, program and





What is the current state of thinking as
expressed by experienced FA 97 officers as to
what the knowledge and skill base of an FA 97
officer should be ?
An FA 97 officer requires, above all else, a sound
understanding of how the business of civilian contractors is
conducted. As part of this, the FA 97 officer needs a sound
business sense, which enables him to distill and analyze vast
amounts of information from disparate sources and make the business
decision of most benefit to the Government .
d. What skills are critical for the FA 97 officer
to possess ?
These critical skills include the general business sense
as discussed in "c" above. As components of this business sense
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are included a thorough understanding of financial and cost
accounting, computer literacy, and the ability to motivate
subordinates to mission accomplishment and the concomitant
management of resources
.
e. What skills are highly desirable for an FA 97
officer to possess ?
The development of specialized accounting skill and the
ability to conduct formal military style briefings are both highly
desirable attributes of an FA 97 officer.
f. How might technical and managerial skills be
distinguished from each other ?
Technical skills are those skills which enable the FA 97
officer to either accomplish the task himself, e.g. cost analysis,
or to have the understanding to be able to communicate with those
specialists who accomplish it in his stead. Managerial skills are
those which enable the FA 97 officer to marshall the resources of
time and money at his disposal to accomplish the contracting
mission.
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1 . Explore the contents of the transition course provided to
assimilate FA 97 officers from their former troop assignments
into the contracting environment.
2. Explore how the FA 97 position structure might be realigned
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in the wake of DAWIA and the impending force drawdown .
3. Explore the feasibility of sending all FA 97 officers to
the Naval Postgraduate School or a similar such military
program for their advanced degrees.
4. Compare and contrast the benefits of a civilian masters of
business administration program vice one such as the Naval
Postgraduate School offers.
5. Explore the possible realignment of the career path and\
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